



UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DE CAMPINAS
INSTITUTO DE ECONOMIA

NEVA NATALIE LÖW

**Migration and Unemployment in the cases of Germany,
France, Italy and Sweden: A trade union perspective**

**Migrações e Desemprego nos casos da Alemanha, França,
Itália e Suécia: Uma perspectiva sindical**

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Abstract

Unemployment and Migration in the cases of Sweden, Germany, Italy and France

A trade union perspective

Migration into Europe has become one of the most heavily discussed topics. Right winged populist forces are gaining support by linking migration to security and by treating migration as a threat to employment, wages and social standards in Europe. Have the trade union positions towards migrants changed since the 2000s? If they have, in what sense did they change? This thesis will firstly analyze the historical migration regimes of Sweden, Germany, Italy and France, and describe the current dynamics. Furthermore, this thesis will present a comparative discussion of the confederations' positions on the issue of migration.

Key words: Migration, Trade Unions, Unemployment, Europe.

Resumo

Desemprego e Migrações nos casos da Suécia, Alemanha, Itália e França

Uma perspectiva sindical

As migrações para a Europa tornaram-se num dos temas mais discutidos na atualidade. As forças da extrema direita populista estão recebendo mais apoio por conta da construção de um discurso que relaciona migrações com as questões da segurança, tratando-as como uma ameaça para o emprego, salários e standards sociais na Europa.

Há uma mudança nas respostas dos sindicatos sobre a migração desde 2000? Se há uma mudança, em que sentido os posicionamentos mudaram? Esta dissertação analisará, primeiro, os regimes migratórios da Suécia, Alemanha, Itália e França numa perspectiva histórica. Posteriormente, apresentará uma análise comparativa dos posicionamentos das Confederações sindicais dos quatro países sobre as dinâmicas migratórias.

Palavras-chave: Migração, Sindicatos, Desemprego, Europa.

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List of Acronyms

DGB: *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* – German Trade Union Confederation

CGIL: *Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro* – Italian General Confederation of Labor

CGT: *Confédération générale du travail* – General Confederation of Labor France

CFDT: *Confédération française démocratique du travail* – French Democratic Confederation of Labor

FO: *Force ouvrière* – General Confederation of Labor – Workers Force

LO: *Landsorganisationen i Sverige* - Swedish Trade Union Confederation

IG Metall: *Industriegewerkschaft Metall* – Industrial Union of Metal Workers

Verdi: *Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft* – German United Services Trade Union

EU: *European Union*

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1 Introduction

Migration has been the number one political issue in Europe ever since the war in Syria has caused a high number of people to seek refuge in the European Union. The vast majority arrives by sea, coming into Italy, Malta and Greece first. Until the Balkan route was closed last year, many refugees made their way from Turkey to Hungary, Austria, and Slovenia by foot. Most migrants strive to reach the richer European countries that still have more accessible asylum policies, namely Germany and Sweden. Trade unions are a stakeholder in the discussion about migration and refugees in Europe. Their positions and discourses shape politics and lead to political measures being adopted.

The central question of this thesis therefore is how the positions of trade unions towards migrants and migrant workers have changed since the 2000s. And if they have changed, how have they changed and in what respects. I develop a comparative analysis of four Western European countries: Sweden, Germany, Italy and France. The historical development of migration into these countries and the political dimensions will give the context of the discussion on trade union positions. I ask if the trade unions of the four countries of interest to this thesis have changed their positions towards migrants since in the 2000s.

This thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter will give a historical perspective on migration into Europe. This chapter aims to contextualize the trade unions positions that will be discussed in the second chapter. Firstly the guest worker and the colonial regimes will be described in their general dynamics. Then the specific migration regimes of the time will be presented for the four countries. The following section will center on neoliberalism in Western Europe. The main economic changes will be briefly discussed and then the neoliberal migration regime will be presented. Given that the institutions of the European Union started to play a larger role in migration policies within the EU, several sections will describe the characteristics of the Europeanization of the migration regime. Subsequently each country's different neoliberal migration regime is discussed. The current situation is introduced by a short summary of the economic crisis that started in 2008. The following items are about the current asylum-migration to Europe. After presenting the fact and figures for the current migration into Europe, the main policy responses on a European level will be gone into. The main events and policy decisions of Sweden, Germany, Italy and France will be summarized. The last section of the first chapter concentrates on migration and the labor market. This will enable an in depth discussion of the trade union positions in chapter two.

The second chapter aims to highlight the trade union perspective on migration. I continue to concentrate on the four countries Sweden, Germany, Italy and France. The chapter starts by describing the Keynesian view of the labor market. His concepts had significant impacts on the labor movements in Western Europe and on trade unions. The main academic theories on the effect of migration on the labor market are presented. Additionally the current debate on the effects of the asylum-migration into Europe will be re-narrated. The following section will go into the different trade unions that exist in Europe. The literature on the diverging labor movement traditions in Western Europe will be reviewed. The subsequent items will go into the trade union traditions and industrial relations of Sweden, Germany, Italy and France. The relationship between migration and trade unions is discussed on the basis of the current literature on the topic. The remaining sections will present an in depth analysis of the trade union positions in Sweden, Germany, Italy and France towards migrants. After briefly recapping the trade union's positions during the fordist migration regime, I trace the changes in their positions towards immigrants. I consider official positions as well as actions toward and with migrants.

While analyzing the trade unions of Sweden, Germany, Italy and France I concentrate on certain trade union confederations. In Sweden the LO-Sweden will serve as the main focus. The LO-Sweden has historically been the most powerful trade union and has had the largest influence on migration issues. In Germany the DGB, the German trade union confederation serves as a case study. While studying the changes that took place within the DGB it is also necessary to take the two largest sectorial unions, the services union Verdi and the metal workers union IG Metall into account. In Italy the CGIL will be the focus of the research. The CGIL has historically been the largest and most influential trade union confederation in Italy. For France I chose to focus on the CGT. Equally the CGT has been the largest trade union, with the most members and therefore with the most influence.

In this thesis the terms *migrant*, *immigrant*, *refugee* and *asylum seeker* are frequently used. While refugee refers to a person that has obtained the official status of a refugee in a country, asylum seekers refers to a person that has submitted an asylum claim but whose claim has not been confirmed yet. Illegalized and irregular migrants refer to migrants without a residence or work permit. Migrant and immigrants is used synonymously, meaning everyone that lives in a country where he/she is not born. Both the categories of refugee and asylum seeker can be subsumed in the category of a migrant or immigrant.

2 Migration in Europe: A historical Perspective

International migration is a dependent variable that only acquires meaning when it meets the borders of destination states. This means that international migration is made visible by the borders of the destination states. Within the destination states international migration is defined by categories. The European member states classify migrants into categories that then have different legal implications. The first difference that European member states undertake is the distinction between “voluntary” and “forced” migration. “Forced” migration implies refugees while “voluntary” migration implies economic migrants. In this context, Geddes (2017) rightly asks “Are migrants voluntary or forced if they leave their countries because of unemployment or poverty?” (7). It becomes clear that the distinction is made by the receiving countries in order to legitimize restrictions (HESS *et al.*, 2016).

European migration regimes ¹ can be divided into a Fordist epoch and a neoliberal epoch. I suggest “an epochal reading” (RYNER; CAFRUNY, 2016) of European migratory developments. It is therefore important to distinguish between the Fordist and the Neoliberal finance- led epochs of European development. Three different phases of migration into Europe can be distinguished from 1945 until now. *The first phase* was from 1945 until 1973 and is characterized by the guest worker and colonial regimes. The dominant mode of production was Fordism. *The second phase*, 1973 until the mid 1990s was characterized by “zero migration” policies and by neoliberal restructuring. Mine workers and factory workers experienced mass dismissals which also affected guest workers. The fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union meant a rise of refugees during this phase. *The third phase*, starting from the mid until the end of the 1990s onwards, was marked by a post- guest worker regime. This phase is marked by the opening up of new labor frontiers in Central and Eastern Europe. Poland, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states served as a labor reserve for Western and Southern European countries. Additionally these countries served as transit countries for migrants coming from outside of Europe (CASTLES, 2014). The dominant mode of production during the second and third phase was postfordistic/neoliberal. Currently this last migration regime is in crisis.

¹ In this context migration regime signifies the set of rules and practices that have developed historically in a country or a region (i.e.: the European Union). A country’s migration regime is usually not the outcome of consistent planning. It is rather a mix of implicit conceptual frames. „The notion of a migration regime allows room for gaps, ambiguities and outright strains: the life of a regime is the result of continuous repair work through practices“ (COLOMBO; SCIORTINO, 2004, 33).

The following sections will describe the main dynamics of the three phases of migrant regimes in Europe. I will focus on the four countries of interest to this thesis: *Italy, France, Germany and Sweden*. While each country has its own historical features there are overarching trends on a European level. As Geddes (2017) puts it: “The story of migration in Europe is not a story of national exceptionalism. There are close ties between the different countries due to European integration”(GEDDES; SCHOLTEN, 2017, 17). The last subchapter of this chapter will give a preview of the current situation. The historical embeddedness of migration in Europe and in the countries of interest in this thesis is important in order to subsequently analyze trade unions responses.

2.1 The guest-worker and colonial migration regimes in Europe

The Fordist epoch, which starts in Europe by the end of World War II, is characterized by the European common market and the international Bretton Woods System. The Fordist regulation emerged in the USA in the 1930s and became generalized after 1945. The productive system was based on the integration of mass production and mass consumption through social wages and productivity growth. Technological innovation and collective agreements led to welfare expansion and the distribution of productivity gains. US hegemony was another important feature, represented by the gold standard, meaning that the USA provided stability and liquidity. This period is characterized by what Gramsci calls integral hegemony: “highly stable relations characterized by a well-developed sense of common purpose and lack of overt antagonism”(CAFRUNY; RYNER, 2007, 143).

Migration was structured by either a guest-worker program or by colonial ties. Both regimes have common features and many countries had a mixture of both. Immigration in Western Europe in the 1950s and 60s was key to economic reconstruction (GEDDES; SCHOLTEN, 2017). Labor immigration peaked in the 1960s. However the notion of the guest worker meant that the migrants were seen as being temporary. The intention was to have temporary migrant laborers come to the host country and then leave again. This was obviously an illusion. During the Fordist epoch political leaders had the image of migration being a “water faucet that can be turned on and off at will“ (CASTLES, 2005). Many migrants chose to stay in the country that recruited them as workers. Even after the official end of the guest worker programs, migration did not cease to happen. Family reunion started being the main port of entrance into Western Europe.

The migrant workers came mostly from the European periphery to Western Europe and from the (former) colonies to the colonial states. There were, however, also other forms of migration even though these were not dominant. European refugees at the end of World War II and returning refugees from Poland to the Federal Republic of Germany repre-

sented a relevant form of migration. Migrants also returned to their home countries after they gained independence from European colonial states, as was the case for Algerians living in France and then returning to Algeria (CASTLES, 2014).

2.1.1 The guest worker regime in Sweden

Sweden developed from a foremost emigration country to a country of immigration after 1945. As Sweden was relatively untouched by the destruction of the Second World War, the Swedish industry experienced a boom in the early years right after the end of the war. Therefore the Swedish labor market was in need of additional laborers early on.

Sweden made use of the Nordic labor with many workers coming from Denmark, Norway and Finland. The Swedish government abolished work permits as early as 1943 and special treatment for laborers from these Nordic countries was implemented in 1954. This had the effect that labor immigration from other countries than the mentioned Nordic countries remained marginal until the 1960s. This also meant that immigration to Sweden was practically free until the end of the 1960s (HARZIG, 1999).

Formalities of immigration only took a day or two. The immigration regime in Sweden was built upon a pact between labor and capital. In the beginning of the guest worker period immigration issues were decided by local unions and employers that compromised on how much labor the local economy was in need of. This specific welfare system effectively blocked the use of migration as a vehicle for wage depreciation and as a guarantee for equal rights and as a “bullwork against discrimination and racial harassment” (SCHIERUP; ÅLUND, 2011, 48). Only during the 1960s did immigration become a concern of the centralized government, together with labor market relations (ROSENBERG, 1995).

During the guest-worker period migrant workers predominantly came from Finland. At the height of the labor-recruitment period in 1970 40 000 of the 74 000 labor migrants were Finish (HARZIG, 1999). Even though most immigrants were Finish, immigration from other, especially Southern European countries increased during the 1960s. This led to a debate on social and economic problems resulting from migration and exploitative working conditions for these labor migrants. The first restrictions on labor immigration were put in place in 1966, which introduced a mandatory labor permit. In order to obtain a labor permit it was necessary for the worker to possess a job contract, to prove that adequate housing was available and to have the consent of the local trade union. The trade union usually assessed if the local labor force was exhausted or not. It thus became more difficult for non-Nordic labor migrants to enter Sweden legally. Labor migrants were to be officially recruited by the Swedish government or the Swedish Labor Market Authority

(AMS) (ROSENBERG, 1995).

The fundamentals of the Swedish immigration and also integration policies were formulated in the following years and its principles are still relevant to this day. In 1975 a progressive reform of policies on immigration and integration were passed through parliament. The slogan of *equality, freedom of choice and partnership*, based on the slogan of the French revolution *égalité, liberté, fraternité*, was the principle of the new laws. They gave access to almost all the established rights of “civil, political and social citizenship, even for immigrant non-citizens” (SCHIERUP; ÅLUND, 2011, 48).

As in other Western European countries, official labor migration recruitment ended in 1972. The main form of immigration from then on was based on family reunification and asylum. As Schierrup (2011) puts it: “The Swedish model appeared to be one of the most balanced political attempts to merge a liberal-universalist framework of citizenship with particular identity claims” (SCHIERUP; ÅLUND, 2011, 49).

2.1.2 The guest worker regime in Germany

Migration in Germany after the end of the Second World War was marked by a highly organized guest worker system. Guest workers were, however, not the only form of migration into the Federal Republic of Germany. Before Germany officially started recruiting foreign workers, the question of refugees was in the focus of the debate about migrants. Refugees from Eastern Europe who had collaborated with the Nazis and former forced laborers as well as former prisoners of concentration camps were migrants in search of a place to stay. After the Second World War an estimated 11 million people were considered Displaced Persons in Europe. Between 1949 and 1961 an estimated 3,8 million people migrated from Eastern to Western Germany (BOJADŽIJEV, 2008, 98).

The German government officially started recruiting foreign laborers in 1950. The Federal Labor Office (BfA) was set up in order to recruit workers in Mediterranean countries. The new fordist methods of production (see chapter 2.1.) required large numbers of low skilled workers. The workers were brought to Germany in groups and the employer then provided accommodation. Recruitment, working conditions and social security were regulated by bilateral agreements with the sending countries (CASTLES, 2014).

Companies started recruiting workers by themselves before the appropriate institutions were created by the government. The stone pit industry in Hannover had employed several Algerian workers in 1955 and dismissed them after they protested against their poor salaries. The first bilateral agreement was signed between Germany and Italy in 1954. However only 57% of the Italian guest workers passed through the official recruitment

procedures to come to Germany. 43% found other ways to immediately work in Germany. In the subsequent years the German government signed agreements with Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. The governments of the sending countries had a large interest in controlling who was able to leave their country. The Franco regime in Spain, for example, wanted to impede regime critics and highly skilled workers to leave. The Federal Republic of Germany wanted to hinder communists from entering the country (BOJADŽIJEV, 2008).

Women represented a relevant part of the guest worker labor force. They were especially important for textiles and clothing as well as for electrical goods and other manufacturing sectors. The amount of female guest workers was 30% by 1970. Of this group about a third was unmarried which questions the image of migrant women only being the wife of the male guest worker. Female guest workers worked and lived separately from their male counterparts. Especially migrant women were expected to leave Germany after a short period of time to marry and start a family in their home country. However, especially women were less likely to go back to their country than male guest workers were (BOJADŽIJEV, 2008, 104).

The general idea of having guest workers was that these workers would leave as soon as the employers didn't need them anymore. However it was impossible to prevent family reunion and permanent settlement. "The Federal Republic of Germany took the system the furthest, but its central element – the legal distinction between the status of citizen and of foreigner as a criterion for determining political and social rights – was to be found throughout Europe" (CASTLES, 2014, 104).

2.1.3 The guest worker regime in Italy: postwar migration

Italy, similarly to other countries of Southern Europe served as a labor supplier for Western European countries. It was therefore an outmigration-country and only became a country of immigration in the 1980s. Internal migration, however, was a main economic driver for the country after WWII. The underdeveloped south was therefore crucial for the economic take off of the Northern triangle between Milan, Turin and Genoa. The character of this internal migration was similar to the foreign worker movements in the Western European countries (CASTLES, 2014).

The construction industry (especially steel-, engine-, and vehicle production) became the dominant industries for Northern Italy. This prompted migration from the South of Italy towards the North that shared many of the same characteristics and challenges that were posed by southern Italian migration to Northern Europe. Some authors (SPARSCHUH, 2014) argue in this direction saying that internal Italian migration shares many or the

same characteristics as migration from Italy to central and Northern Europe. However, there was one major difference: Southern Italians were citizens in Northern Italy while they were non-citizens in central and Northern Europe, such as Germany.

National ties within Italy were feeble after 1945. The recent Italian unification, in 1861 and the harsh differences between the prosperous north and the impoverished south led to diverging class structures, political systems and cultural realities between the regions. Some even go so far as to argue that different societies existed within Italy. The vast majority of migrants came from the region south of Rome consisting of Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria and the two main islands Sardinia and Sicily. They were typically between twenty and forty years old and mainly male. Their level of education was considerably lower than that of the population of the receiving cities and regions. Additionally, before the television in Italy “nationalized” (SPARSCHUH, 2014) the Italian language, considerable language differences existed between the North and the South. The migrants were confronted with prejudices and a heated public debated about the higher rate of criminality and their deviant political orientation.

Migration in Italy was highly regulated. A law, dating back to the fascist regime, was still in place until 1961. It restricted the possibility to migrate into larger cities and even enabled expulsions of therefore illegalized migrants. This *leggi contro l’urbanesimo* illegalized migrants without an employment and housing and therefore also curtailed their political and social rights. Labor migrants were given the least qualified and hardest jobs.

Another important feature of the migration regime within Italy was the demand in domestic labor and personal services. Migration from the South to the North of Italy and from rural to urban areas provided middle and upper class families with domestic workers. “For most of the twentieth century generic domestic service – as well as a variety of more specialized jobs like cook, laundry-maker and nanny – was the Italian female equivalent of the assembly line” (COLOMBO; SCIORTINO, 2004, 117).

Similar to labor migration to Northern Europe, the migration of laborers from the South to the North of Italy was followed by a phase of family reunification. Even though these workers were also seen as “guest workers” and therefore temporary, in the end they stayed in the Northern regions.

2.1.4 The guest worker regime in France: (post) colonial ties

After the end of the Second World War France was, similar to other countries of Western Europe, faced with labor shortages. This, paired with low birth rates led the French government to promote migration as a solution. Migration to France was there-

fore a mixture of the effect of colonial ties and of explicit migrant labor recruitment and illegalized migration.

Due to colonial ties to Northern Africa, citizens of those countries were not considered as migrants and their entry and exit of France was not controlled. Legally they enjoyed the same rights as French citizens. After the colonies gained independence this relationship started to change. The French government enacted several legislations in order to limit immigration from the former colonies. A quota for Algerian citizens was even defined. This was ineffective and France experienced large-scale spontaneous immigration from former colonies in the Maghreb, from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Many of these immigrants entered France illegally and stayed in an illegalized situation until they were either legalized through an employment or through the general legalization wave of the French government in 1960 (ABDALLAH, 2000).

In order to organize the recruitment of workers from Southern Europe the French government established the *Office National d'Immigration (ONI)*. The ONI coordinated the employment of 150 000 seasonal workers from Spain. However the ONI was not able to sufficiently recruit the number of workers that the French economy was in need of. Companies had to undergo a complicated bureaucratic process to recruit workers through the ONI so that most preferred to find other ways to counter their labor shortages. Therefore companies recruited workers directly in Southern Europe and Northern Africa and regularized them later on through the ONI (HANSEN, 2003).

2.2 The neoliberal migration regimes in Europe

The neoliberal migration regime is marked by the economic changes of the period. There were considerable shifts in the economic policies in Europe. I will therefore firstly go into the main economic characteristics of the period before describing the main features of migration during the neoliberal regime. Both phases of the migration regime, the zero migration doctrine and the post-guest worker regime apply to the four countries Sweden, Germany, Italy and France.

2.2.1 Neoliberalism in Europe

By the end of the 1960s Fordism began to experience serious strains. Lower productivity led to a decrease in the rate of profit. The recovery of the crisis of the 1970s in Europe was based on export-oriented strategies. Especially Germany specialized in high-value-added manufactured goods. Monetarism therefore enjoyed high ideological esteem. The neoliberal restructuring of Europe of the 1980s and 1990s helped institutionalize a finance-led epoch of capitalism. Production and consumption were integrated by the ex-

tension of debt.

On an ideological level neoliberalism was prepared by the *Société du Mont-Pélerin* in the 1940s. In the 1970s the University of Chicago served as the academic and ideological hub for neoliberalism. By the end of the 1970s neoliberal economic principles had been adopted and were being promoted by international organizations such as the *Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development* (OECD) and the *International Monetary Fund* (IMF). With the election of Ronald Reagan in the USA and Margret Thatcher in the United Kingdom neoliberal politics of deregulation and liberalizations were being implemented in two leading economies of the world (CROUCH, 2011).

Neoliberalism was accompanied by various contradictions. One of them was the need to invest in ever riskier segments of the market in order to produce growth, such as the real estate in Southern and Eastern Europe. Interest bearing capital (meaning fictitious capital and derivatives) grew faster than the industrial capital. This can be seen as one of the major contradictions that led to the current economic crisis. In Germany private loans from banks and other financial institutions (as percentage of GDP) rose from 39% in 1960 to 72% in 1973 to 105% in 2007. Therefore the volume of credit grew faster than the GDP. These figures and tendencies can be translated to a global level. In 1990 global financial assets were equivalent to 263% of the global domestic product, in 2007 they were 355% (DEMIROVIĆ, 2013).

Those having a social interest in neoliberal restructuring were (and are) transnational businesses connected to transatlantic circuits of capital accumulation. Neoliberalism is characterized by minimal hegemony: “Neoliberal ideology... still cements capitalist ruling classes together in an organic alliance and, although institutional arrangements increasingly fail to provide material concessions consistent with civil societal norms, there is not a sufficiently strong counter-movement to challenge this order on the ‘ethico-political’ level” (CAFRUNY; RYNER, 2007, 144). Additionally average real wages have stagnated in all of the Global North since the 1990s. This has been accompanied by an increase in inequality. The stagnation in real wages was in part compensated by debts of wage earners. These debts often covered day to day expenses such as housing, university fees, cars and medical bills. They have often replaced social state initiatives. Furthermore the income disparity among wage-earners increased significantly. While the real wages of the poorer wage-earners has dropped and their lives have become more precarious, the real wages of the richer wage-earners have actually increased (CANDEIAS, 2004).

Another characteristic of the neoliberal epoch is the financialization of companies. An increasing share of the profits industrial and trading companies earn is by speculation

on the financial markets. These speculations led to a re-distribution of profits within the capitalist class itself. This process has been increasingly organized by investment bank and private equity funds that have therefore gained significance from the 1980s onwards. A consequence of this process has been that companies have concentrated more on their core business, which has led to a fragmentation of value chains and a reduction of production. "Commodities are then produced by contract manufacturers frequently operating from low-wage countries" (DEMIROVIĆ, 2013). Also the internationalization of capital and the relocation of productive capital to the global south (so called "offshoring") has increased.

2.2.2 The neoliberal migration regime in Europe

After the oil crisis in 1973 the guest worker programs in European countries came to an end. Migration policies suddenly changed and given the rise in unemployment, European countries adopted zero immigration policies. This meant that the main legal route for migration was through family reunification.

Another shift in migration policies took place at the end of the 1990s in Europe. There was a slow tendency to abandon the "zero migration" goal and to acknowledge an economic and demographic need of migrants². Additionally undocumented migration was perceived as a security threat and therefore policy makers decided to open up more legal routes for migrants instead. Schemes for temporary or seasonal workers were set up in Germany, Sweden and Italy (CASTLES, 2006). The *Forschungsgruppe Staatsprojekt Europa (2014)* argue that migration politics in Europe starting from the 1990s onwards, were marked by a Europeanization of these politics and, similar to the arguments made by Castles (CASTLES, 2005), by a slow replacement of policies that aimed at sealing off the European continent from migrants. There was a recruitment of highly skilled workers paired with the quasi exploitation of illegalized immigrants. The need for labor in certain sectors led to increased and more flexible migration. One consequence was also the redistribution of domestic work towards migrant women who often worked (and still continue to work) in precarious and illegalized situations (BUCKEL *et al.*, 2014).

On a European level, the European Commission officially abandoned its "zero migration"³ goal in 2000. The reasoning was that Europe was in need of migration due to demographics and that the social system will not be able to sustain itself without a controlled influx of migration. This change towards a post-guest worker regime risked provoking negative reactions from the European public. Therefore the European Commission

² The "zero migration policy" applies mainly to immigrants from outside of the European Union. The internal migration within the European Union was facilitated by the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Amsterdam.

³ Here I refer to immigrants from outside of the European Union.

was keen on accentuating a stern stance towards illegal migration (BUCKEL *et al.*, 2014).

An important expression of the shift in migration policies of the European Commission towards a system of managed migration was the proposal of the Blue Card in 2007. The European Commission wanted to enable and harmonize the immigration of highly skilled workers in the European Union. The Commission argued that migration is the solution to the problem of demography in Europe and to the problem of a shortage of labor in certain skilled sectors. The Blue Card meant to enable the supply of qualified workers for the sectors and regions that needed them. Additionally, the European Union was to become more competitive in the recruitment of workers. This initiative would have also meant a beginning Europeanization of the still strongly national labor markets. Furthermore the gaps in qualified labor could be solved without investing in education and vocational training and therefore without having to spend public funds. However, this initiative proved to be too ambitious and in the end the European Council, therefore the member states, softened the most important parts of the legislation, leaving the organization of the recruitment of highly skilled workers in the competence of the member states. The European IT industry had been especially keen on the Blue Card. Labor Unions, as well as conservative forces were skeptical. In the end the managed migration that was proposed by the Commission through the Blue Card did not succeed. However, it initiated a policy direction for the member states towards a managed migration that took on different forms on the member states (GEORGI *et al.*, 2014).

The accession of several Eastern European countries in 2004 additionally changed the situation of many guest workers in Western Europe. Several countries, such as Germany and Sweden introduced a waiting period for workers from the new member states (CASTLES, 2006).

The introduction of the Dublin II decree in 2003 marked an essential point in the Europeanization of migration politics. The Dublin II decree introduced common rules for the Asylum system. The Dublin Regulation aims to rapidly determine the Member State responsible for an asylum claim and provides for the transfer of an asylum seeker to that Member State. Usually, the responsible Member State is the state through which the asylum seeker first entered the EU. This means that the state in which the migrant person first sets foot on European territory is responsible for his or her asylum claim. Migrants can therefore not freely choose which country they want to claim asylum in. Countries of the European south have especially been under increased pressure to secure their external borders. Greece, Italy and Malta are particularly affected by the Dublin regulation since many migrants pass through these three countries in order to reach Europe (MEYER-HÖFER *et al.*, 2014).

In reaction to the Dublin regulations southern European states were at the forefront of initiatives to externalize the responsibility of securing their borders to northern African states. Bilateral agreements were meant to hinder migrants from crossing the Mediterranean sea. Italy was one of the first Southern European states to reach a deal with a Northern African state – Libya. The first official deal was signed by both countries in 2000 stressed the increased collaboration in the control of illegal migration. Italy provided Libya with surveillance technologies, built camps for illegalized immigrations and financed and operationalized deportation flights from Italy to Libya and from Libya to other states. In the following ten years several other similar accords were signed between these two countries, further enhancing cooperation. Mixed border control teams surveilled the sea and Italian border control agents trained their Libyan counterparts on how to hinder migrants from leaving the Libyan coast. These deals can be seen as blueprints for the politics of the European Union when externalizing its borders (PICHL; VESTER, 2014).

2.2.2.1 The securitization of migration and the obligations of migrants

Another important characteristic of the neoliberal migration regime in Europe is the securitization⁴ of migration and a shift in the discursive perception of migration. Additionally the debate about migration in Europe has been increasingly linked to the welfare state and to the concept of citizenship. These two characteristics of the neoliberal migration regime will be described and analyzed in this section.

The securitization of migration (HUYSMANS, 2000) implies that asylum seekers and immigrants are portrayed as a challenge to the protection of national identity and welfare provisions. Migration is seen as a force which endangers the good life in western European countries. “EU policies support, often indirectly, expressions of welfare chauvinism and the idea of cultural hegemony as stabilizing factor “ (HUYSMANS, 2000, 753). Additionally there is a confusion of immigration and asylum. Asylum has been increasingly politicized as an alternative route for economic immigration into the EU. This explains, so Jef Huysmans, why asylum is so easily connected to illegal immigration. An example of this dynamic is the creation of the EURODAC fingerprint database for asylum seekers. The creation of the EURODAC was justified by the “rise in illegal immigration”. “ The development of security discourses and policies in the area of migration is often presented as an inevitable policy response to the challenges for public order and domestic stability of the increases in the number of (illegal) immigrants and asylum seekers. . . The policy is an instrument to protect the state, its society and the internal market against the dangers related to an invasion of (illegal) immigrants and asylum seekers” (HUYSMANS, 2000, 757).

⁴ The securitization of migration means that asylum seekers and immigrants are perceived as a threat to the protection of national identity and welfare provisions.

The securitization of migration has fostered racism and xenophobia by linking asylum-seekers and migrants to negative things. “Migration has become a meta issue, that is, a phenomenon that can be referred to as the cause of many problems” (HUYSMANS, 2000, 761). The discourse in integration, which is linked to the securitization of migration, has directly and indirectly confirmed a nationalist desire for a culturally homogenous society. It contains the notion that the different life style and culture of migrants are potentially destabilizing to the social formation. Migrants are expected to opt for the “hosting” society. “The state is asserting its role as protector of national identity and social cohesion. One of the ways it seeks to achieve these objectives is through demonstrating its ability to control and manage migrations and diversity” (KOFMAN, 2005, 455).

Migration has started to feature prominently in the struggle over the welfare state. Given that the welfare state is under increased pressure through neoliberal forces, a form of welfare chauvinism (HUYSMANS, 2000) has emerged. Immigrants and asylum-seekers are not only rivals but illegitimate recipients of socio-economic rights. The use of metaphors such as “flood” or “invasion” of asylum-seekers by some media outlets confirms these xenophobic tendencies. “In the political spectacle these metaphors help to dramatize the socio-economic problematic of the welfare state by framing it in a security discourse: experiences of economic and social uncertainty are translated into opposition to and fear of immigrants and asylum seekers” (HUYSMANS, 2000, 769).

There was a widening gap between the citizens and the disruptive outsiders. Here, especially the figure of the asylum seeker served as the outsider. “A more contractual model of citizenship with an emphasis on obligations” started to emerge (KOFMAN, 2005, 455). Considering asylum seekers and immigrants the term “tipping point” started to be used to refer to unacceptable levels of rapid immigration. The term “threshold of tolerance” was introduced into the discourse on migration in European states. “The danger of the application of such a quantified level of tolerance was not so much in its formulation but in the way that it allowed for the manipulation of ideas. One is able to reject the foreigner in the name of science” (KOFMAN, 2005, 460).

Another feature of the discourse about migration in Europe were and are the imposition of conditions for the access to citizenship and for the access to social services. This involves problematizing the cultures of “other” ethnic groups – especially those of immigrants and asylum seekers who are seen as incompatible with the “normal” population. “Women as border guards of cultural difference and reproducers of the migrant population, now and in the future, serve to demonstrate the backwardness and maintenance of traditions” (KOFMAN, 2005, 461). This explains the specific programs geared towards

migrant women (such as language classes) who are supposedly especially oppressed by the patriarchal structures of their cultural context.

2.2.3 The neoliberal migration regime in Sweden

Sweden is often celebrated as the most progressive and immigrant friendly country of the world. The World Bank states that Sweden provides the most favorable conditions for migrants in Europe (World Bank, 2017).

Official labor recruitment was stopped in 1972. However, even though labor migration officially came to an end, immigration to Sweden did not cease to exist. The main form of immigration was then organized through family reunion. Restrictive measures were introduced concerning labor migration to Sweden. Policies towards refugees on the other hand were notable for their generosity.

As a result the number of asylum-seekers increased. During the 1980s most refugees came from coup-countries in Latin America, Turkey, Lebanon, Iran and Iraq. During the 1990s asylum seekers came mainly from the post Soviet Union countries and from former Yugoslavia. The 2000s have seen intense family reunifications from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo and refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq, especially after the US invasion. By the mid-1990s, over 10% of Sweden's inhabitants were foreign-born, and 13% were either foreign-born or Swedish-born with two foreign-born parents (Eger, 2010). Currently Sweden, out of all the countries of the Global North, has the largest population of recent "foreign background". "Indeed taking together people of foreign origin and second-generation immigrants, people from a foreign background account for over 20% of Sweden's total population; of these, more than half are from non-European backgrounds (BONFANTI, 2014, 379).

1975 presented an important marking point for migration politics after the end of the official labor recruitment programs. A number of progressive laws on immigration were passed with a universalist conception of citizenship that implied a vision of social citizenship and a multicultural view of the nation. The policy guaranteed access to almost all established rights of civil, political and social citizenship for immigrants (BONFANTI, 2014). "The Swedish model appeared to be one of the most balanced political attempts to merge a liberal-universalist framework of citizenship with particular identity claims" (SCHIERUP; ÅLUND, 2011, 48).

However, this specific Swedish model was also charged with contradictions. The 1980s saw a general rise in unemployment and therefore also a rise in unemployment of the immigration population. The Swedish society witnessed a rise in racism and xenopho-

bia. Members of violent Nazi grassroots movements burned down refugee camps across the country and a populist party, the New Democracy, won seats in the parliament in 1991 due to their harsh anti-immigration rhetoric (SCHIERUP; ÅLUND, 2011).

As an answer to these political upheavals, a broad coalition of moderate left and right forces joined together to agree on a new integration policy in 1997. This new integration policy targeted the entire population and was intended to create a new Swedish identity based on shared democratic values. "...there was an obvious convergence with the neoliberal turn in Swedish politics in general, in which the ruling 'third way' Social Democratic party elite is the driving force. The merging integration policy with new policies for economic growth and social inclusion through business friendly policies is evident in a range of public reports. The buzzwords of the refurbished policies for integration are 'lifelong learning', 'employability' and 'ethnic entrepreneurship'" (SCHIERUP; ÅLUND, 2011, 49). The focus shifted from "equality of outcome" to "equal opportunities".

This has caused a growing number of migrants and minority ethnic Swedes to have been pushed from the center to the periphery of the welfare system and into a degraded informal sector. Youth unemployment among those with immigrant background has risen considerably and employment conditions for those in precarious labor relations has deteriorated. Poverty is heavily concentrated in migrant and minority ethnic families in the major big cities. Satellite towns have emerged into stigmatized territories with a reputation for social problems. These suburban areas have become hotspots for urban unrest (SCHIERUP; ÅLUND, 2011).

Sweden joined the Schengen area⁵ in 2001 leading to increased migration from other EU countries. A new law was introduced in 2008 that was called a law on "labour immigration". This law represents a new form of labor migration management in Sweden. It was introduced by the center right government with support from the Greens, and was primarily aimed at expanding labor immigration. It identified employers as being best suited to understand their own recruitment needs and it transferred the authority for processing cases involving resident and work permits from the Swedish public labor market authorities to the Swedish Migration Board. This additionally represents the undermining of trade unions' influence on labor migration issues. The residence permit is linked to the duration of the employment contract and is limited to certain sectors of the labor market. After 4 years the migrant can apply for full citizenship. The paradigm of managed migration is clearly represented in this labor reform. "The Swedish reform

⁵ The *Schengen area* means an area comprising of European states that mostly functions as a single country for international travel purposes, with a common visa policy. States in the Schengen Area have eliminated border controls with other Schengen members and strengthened border controls with non-Schengen countries.

mainly reflects the interests of employer organisations” (BONFANTI, 2014, 377). This reform additionally deepened the distinction between people who need Sweden, meaning asylum seekers, and the people Sweden needs, meaning labor migrants.

2.2.4 The neoliberal migration regime in Germany

In spite of the official end of the guest worker programs, migration continued to rise in Germany in the 1970s. One of the reasons for this was the intensified family reunification that started after 1973. The government and leading politicians promoted the discourse about “zero migration” which also had legal implications. The German government pushed for the willingness of guest workers to return. Bonuses were offered for those who chose to return to their country of origin. However, this implied that the former guest workers had to renounce their pension rights that they had gained during their time working in Germany. In the end the bonus wasn’t very successful meaning that only those who had already planned to leave Germany accepted the 10 000 DM offered by the government. Additionally, family reunion became increasingly difficult in the 1980s. The minimum age for children that had the right to enter the country through family reunification was reduced several times (BOJADŽIJEV, 2008).

Another characteristic of the neoliberal migration regime in Germany was the rise in asylum-migration. Given that the immigration route of the guest worker program was pretty much closed off and that family reunification became increasingly difficult, more and more migrants chose to opt for asylum as a means of entering the country legally. In the years between 1984 and 1992 the number of asylum seekers in Germany was 440 000. However at the same time less and less asylum applicants were granted the right to asylum. The countries of origin of asylum seekers also changed over time. Until the mid 1980s this group consisted mainly of nationals from African and Asian countries and from Turkey while the majority of asylum seekers came from Eastern Europe in the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Iraq and in Turkey led to an increase of asylum seekers from these regions as well (BOJADŽIJEV, 2008).

On a discursive level, the difference between “illegitimate” economic refuge and “legitimate” political refuge was being made. Especially tabloid newspapers agitated against the “abuse” of the social system by migrants. The heated debate about migration climaxed during a wave of violence towards immigrants in Germany in the 1990s. In September 1991 a racist mob lit up accommodation facilities for asylum seekers in the town of Hoyerswerda. In the following two weeks similar racist crimes were reported in over a dozen German towns and villages. In winter 1992 three migrants burnt to death because two teenagers set their house on fire. Another housing for asylum seekers was burnt down by a mob that rampaged through the city of Rostock-Lichtenhagen. This is the reason

why the coalition government between the Social democracy and the Green Party in 1998 announced the struggle against racism as their priority. This government marked the end of the “zero” migration policy and presents a shift towards managed migration (KAN-NANKULAM, 2014). The main point of managed migration is the acknowledgement that migration cannot be turned on and off and that it is therefore necessary to control it. Furthermore Germany wanted to start attracting highly skilled workers. The red-green government started a debate about a possible green card system similar to the one in the USA. In the end a new immigration bill entered into force in 2005 (BOJADŽIJEV, 2008). One of the main points of this new piece of legislation was the simplification for highly qualified workers to gain permanent residence. Additionally foreign students at Germany universities had the possibility of looking for a job in Germany during the time period of one year after they graduated (FAZ, 2004). Both measures point towards a German version of managed migration.

However, even before a system of managed migration was officially implemented, immigration was a reality and was part of the German labor market. Germany introduced a number of foreign worker programs, the largest being the foreign workers program of 1991 that allowed migrants from central and eastern European countries to work for up to three months in catering, building and agriculture. Another such program is the foreign “contract workers”. This meant a transnational subcontract arrangement, allowing workers to be employed by a company of their home country but to work in i.e. Germany. It implied lower wages and social costs for those receiving the labor in Germany. Stephan Castles (2006) writes: “More than 200 000 employees from other EU countries were working on German construction sites in 1999” (CASTLES, 2006, 751). Therefore the German model of long-term employment was being undermined in these specific sectors. “The decline of the long term employment model and its replacement with contract workers thus had negative effects on social integration and intergroup relations” (CASTLES, 2006, 751).

Another important aspect of the neoliberal migration regime in Germany, especially of the managed migration regime beginning in the 2000s, was the discursive link between migration and terrorism. After the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in the United States, this became an important mode to legitimize restrictions on, especially, asylum migration. The new migration bill 2005 makes specific reference to terrorism, making the deportation of individuals deemed “dangerous” easier and quicker (FAZ, 2004).

2.2.5 The neoliberal migration regime in Italy

International immigration to Italy became an issue later than in Sweden, France and Germany. Being primarily a country of emigration and internal immigration, the moment where Italy became a country of international immigration is an important marking

point. The Italian neoliberal migration regime is characterized by illegalized migrants, a strong securitization of migration and then eventually a turn towards a labor migration orientation of migration policies.

The first time more immigrants came to Italy and than emigrants leaving the country was in the mid 1970s. In Italy, as in other Southern European countries, immigration arrived in a more contradictory post-Fordist era than in the Northern European states (COLOMBO; SCIORTINO, 2004).

One of the first sectors to experience increased immigration from abroad, and not from within Italy was the sector of domestic services and labor. Towards the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, live-in maids from former Italian colonies were a phenomenon even acknowledged and discussed by the press. Active recruitment was managed by the Catholic Church through its missionary network in the beginning. Women were therefore the majority of the foreign residents in the years between 1970 and 1980s. The first restrictive laws passed on immigration in Italy also targeted this group of foreign laborers. In 1972 the Ministry of Labor restricted foreign domestic work to live-in contracts, thus denying foreign women the more appealing option of hourly paid work. Additionally a change in employer would have entailed returning to the sending country for at least three years. These regulations produced widespread undocumented work and migrants in the sector. Foreign domestic workers were therefore an important pillar of the Italian welfare regime and enjoyed a fair degree of tolerance. They were subject to numerous amnesty programs and regularizations (COLOMBO; SCIORTINO, 2004).

The increase in international immigrants in Italy coincided with the transition of the domestic economy of the country. The domestic economy transformed from an industrial to a service society. This coincided with an increase in poverty, turning it into one of the countries with the highest inequalities in the European continent. The indice of poverty increased from 8,3 % to 14,4% between 1980 and 1989. Therefore the rise in immigration took place at the same time as many Italians were suffering some degree of degradation of their living standards. Additionally, traditional structures of solidarity, such as trade unions, and the country's rich leftist culture started to give way to more conservative ideologies and consumerist ways of life. In the 1980s the large political forces of the country, the Christian Democratic Party and the Socialist Party ceased to be the stronghold they once were. Silvio Berlusconi's party Forza Italia started gaining strength (FALCI, 2011).

Migration to Italy has been marked by a large proportion of illegalized immigrants. Conservative estimates mention that about 500 000 to 700 000 illegalized people lived in Italy in 2011. In the last 30 years being illegal at some point was part of the migra-

tory process to Italy. Frequent amnesties and mass regularizations made being illegal a temporary status for most migrants (FALCI, 2011). “Six amnesties in 22 years speak of a labor market that in the end has always forced politicians to recognize the de facto inclusion of unauthorized immigrants in the economic system” (AMBROSINI, 2013, 192).

The first important law concerning immigration was the *Martelli Law* of 1989. For the first time this law regulated the status of refugees in the country and that of migrants who resided in Italy but did not possess a working contract. A ministry for Immigration was even created due to the *Martelli Law*. It was later incorporated into the Ministry of Social Affairs. The 1990s were marked by a series of regulations of illegalized migrants. This meant a turning point in migration policies in Italy: “the provision of this integral law made it clear that the Italian government no longer considered immigration flows as a transitory event, but rather acknowledged that the phenomenon would continue to impose challenges and provide opportunities to the country” (FALCI, 2011, 82). Additionally laws were passed providing illegalized immigrants with basic rights and with access to social services.

The next important law on migration that changed the migration regime substantially was the *Turco-Napolitano Law* of 1998. The main aims of the law were on the one hand to fight illegal immigration and on the other hand to plan and regulate the inflow of, especially labor, immigrants to the country. “Temporary detention centers” (FALCI, 2011, 86) were created and forced expulsions intensified.

The *Bossi Fini Law* of 2002 replaced many provisions of the law of 1998 and introduced a closer link between residence and work and immigration while being even more rigorous on illegalized immigration. This can be seen as an Italian version of managed migration. “The Italian version of ‘reluctant importation’ of foreign labor has therefore been based on an attitude of formal closure, of substantial tolerance (if not absolute, at least widespread enough), and of a posteriori recognition of immigrant workers’ entry and inclusion, more than on an attitude of strict control and selection of candidates”. (AMBROSINI, 2013, 189). Immigrants are widespread in the center-north provinces and immigrants are highly represented in agriculture, less qualified services and also in significant industrial sectors, especially in the construction sector.

2.2.6 The neoliberal migration regime in France

1974 marked the official end of the labor recruitment programs in France. Border controls were intensified and immigrants were incentivized to return to their home country. As in most other European states, this did not lead to a massive return of migrants. It is estimated that solely 1 % to 2 % of the recruited labor migrants went back

to their countries of origin with the help of government programs (LAUBENTHAL, 2006).

A central characteristic of the French neoliberal migration regime was the increased struggle against illegalized migration. The first laws that were passed concerning undocumented migration in the 1980s focused on facilitating deportations of people with an illegal residence status. At the same time the first wave of legalizations of a group of 3000 illegalized Turkish migrants took place in 1979. While being illegal was solely a precarious status before gaining a legal residence permit during the fordist migration regimes, being illegalized turned out to be a permanent situation for many immigrants during the neoliberal migration regime. At the same time *sans papiers* were a fundamental part of the French economy (VASSILIS; KARAKAYALI, 2008). Estimates suggest that between 200 000 and one million illegalized immigrants reside in France⁶. „Immigrants who enter the low end of the labor market in France, as elsewhere, can play a variety of different social roles. Through no choice of their own, they often work in jobs well below their skill levels, without basic protections or enforceable right, and in so doing help employers keep costs down and undermine union efforts at representation and growth“ (TURNER, 2014, 85).

The left winged government of Mitterand in 1981 marked an important turning point. The government campaigned with the promise to end the inhumane treatment of immigrants. Many of the repressive laws that had been enacted by the previous parties in power were changed and immigrant’s possibility to gain a residence permit was facilitated. In order to obtain a residence permit for a period of 10 years migrants merely needed to prove that they had a work contract. However, this “generosity” was paired with an increased struggle against “illegal” migration. Deportations and deportation centers were institutionalized in France during this period.

Another feature of the neoliberal migration regime was a reform of the laws to gain French citizenship. During the 1990s numerous bills were passed that made the acquisition of the French nationality more and more difficult and that subsequently decreased the privileges of citizens of the former colonies. This dynamic also led to an increase in immigrants in an illegal situation. Police forces were equipped with extended rights to conduct identity controls in public places leading to increased repression of illegal immigrants (ABDALLAH, 2000).

Another characteristic of the neoliberal migration regime in France has been the discourse about French identity. The French discourse couples an attachment towards France with republican values. Secularism, as a key republican value, has been geared towards Muslims in a gendered way. Women wearing a headscarf has been interpreted as a direct challenge

⁶ Numbers are from 2014.

to republican values. The French government therefore banned the wearing of “overtly religious symbols” in public schools in 2004 (KOFMAN, 2005).

The 2000s marked another turn in the immigration policies in France. Before, employers were penalized with high payments if they were caught employing an illegalized immigrant. This was changed in 2007 with the *Loi Hortefeux*, which enabled employers to apply for the legalization of their employees. However, this possibility was restricted to certain sectors that were in need of labor. In the end this opened up the possibility for a common struggle of *sans papiers* and trade unions in their work place (LÖW, 2013).

Therefore another relevant characteristic of the neoliberal migration regime was the mobilization of illegalized immigrants. The two most relevant movements were the movement of St. Bernard and the strike waves in 2008-2010. The struggle of the *sans papiers* were an integral part of the social mobilizations that took place in the country in the 1990s and 2000s which meant substantial infrastructure of collectives and supportive organizations (LÖW, 2013).

2.3 The crisis of the European migration regime

The crises of the European migration regime is inherently linked to the multiple crisis that is persistent in the European Union. The economic crisis that started in 2008 has not been solved yet and the social and political crisis that followed the economic crisis play into the current management of the “migration crisis”. I will therefore briefly go into the dynamics of the current economic crisis before describing the current migration situation Europe. I will then briefly go into the European policy measures that have been taken in reaction to the migration crisis. A more detailed discussion of the current migration situation will be presented in the following chapter of this thesis.

2.3.1 The economic crisis in Europe

The crisis in Europe started with the global financial crisis of 2008. Since then economic, political and social crisis have been present in Europe. The subprime mortgage crisis in the USA led to a bank crisis and later to the crisis of the EURO.

The crisis in Europe was widely interpreted as a crisis of state debt. Mainstream economists and leading heads of states blamed ill adapted social systems, high public spending, an inflated public sector and a lack of competitiveness for the crisis. “The bourgeois society is undergoing a multiple crisis, alongside a major crisis in the capitalist mode of production... We are dealing with a crisis of the finance dominated regime of production, which is the dominant form of valorization of capital that evolved after the 1970s as a re-

sponse to the crisis of Fordism”(DEMIROVIĆ; SABLowski, 2013). The current crisis is a “crisis of the finance-dominated regime of accumulation”(DEMIROVIĆ; SABLowski, 2013). The first feature is over-production. Given that wages decreased, their importance in demand also decreased as well as state demand. The second is the increased debt. The debt held by wage earners cannot be indefinitely expanded. Wage earners are experiencing a deterioration of their standard of living while banks have to write off large parts of their credits. Debt also concerns states and banks. Higher taxes for wage earners and cuts to social policies can no longer compensate for reductions of the state revenue and the tax reductions for capital. Structural budget deficits have become the new normal in the crisis. “Such shifting between state and private debt hardly conceals the fact that the total amount of debt has reached heights that threaten the capacity of the system as a whole to reproduce itself and that a massive destruction of capital may be unavoidable”(DEMIROVIĆ; SABLowski, 2013).

One of the policy measures taken by European leaders were harsh austerity programs. “In sum, we can say that the austerity regime of the last five years is nothing more than the final stage of implementing a neoliberal project that was initiated four decades earlier. The sovereign debt crisis proved to be a major advance in this regard, insofar as neoliberal actors took advantage of it to consolidate the power of informal and unaccountable agencies” (BUCKEL, 2016).

2.3.2 Current asylum-migration to Europe

The number of migrants seeking asylum in Europe has increased considerably in the last 3 years⁷. The two graphics show the number of asylum applicants in Europe by country of origin and by the country the asylum was asked for. While there were 373 545 asylum applications in 2012, there were 1 393 285 in 2015. Another striking difference between these two years is the countries where asylum seekers apply and the countries of origin of the migrants. Germany, France and Sweden, were among the countries that were most attractive for those seeking asylum in 2012. France had 16,4% of the share of asylum applications within the EU, Sweden 11,7%, and Germany 20,7%. In 2015 this changed dramatically, with Germany being by far the country with the most asylum applications (476 620 in 2015 representing 34,2% of the total asylum applications in the EU). France

⁷ When discussing migration in Europe one must not forget that the overwhelming number of migrants are hosted in countries of the Middle East and Africa. Jordan for example hosts 1.4 million Syrians, of which 630 000 are registered as refugees with the UNHCR. This equates to about 20% of their total population. 70% are women and children. Lebanon hosts a high number of Syrian refugees registered by the UNHCR – about one million. The actual number of Syrians in Lebanon is unclear but is estimated at about 1.3 million (European Union, 2016). “As displacement rises still further, with refugee numbers climbing to 21 million in 2015 and likely even higher in 2016, the need to find an effective response to both massive displacement and unmanaged migration has become increasingly urgent”(PAPADEMETRIOU; FRATZKE, 2016)

on the other hand only received 5, 4% of the asylum applications. These numbers suggest that there have been significant policy changes within Europe, especially in between the member states, that led to such great shifts of asylum seekers in between the member states. Another important characteristic of asylum seekers in the EU is their country of origin. It becomes clear that the number of Syrian refugees has risen significantly between 2012 and 2015. In 2014 Syrian nationals were the largest group seeking asylum in the EU. This is clearly linked to the ongoing war in Syria and also to the high possibility of Syrian nationals of receiving a refugee status (Migration Policy Institute, 2017).


In 2016 the EU received about 1.3 million asylum applications for 28 member states. In 2001 asylum applications reached 424 thousand in the EU-27⁸. These statistics can be misleading however, given that asylum seekers have the possibility to repeal a negative verdicts, there is a considerable number of asylum seekers that apply for two to three times. Eurostat estimates 4% of the total number of asylum seekers are second or third time applications. This latest figure for 2016 marked a decrease of 53 thousand first time applicants across the EU-28 in comparison with the year before, as the number of first time applicants fell from almost 1.26 million in 2015 to 1.20 million in 2016. In 2016, the number of first time asylum applicants in the EU-28 from Syria fell back slightly to 335 thousand from 363 thousand in 2015; the share of Syrian citizens in the total dropped from 28.9 % to 27.8 %. Afghani citizens accounted for 15 % of the total number of first time asylum applicants and Iraqis for 11%, while Pakistanis and Nigerians accounted for 4 % each (Eurostat, 2017a).

More than four in five (83 %) of the first time asylum seekers in the EU-28 in 2016 were less than 35 years old. Those in the age range 18–34 years accounted for slightly more than half (51 %) of the total number of first time applicants, while nearly one third (32 %) of the total number of first time applicants were minors aged less than 18 years (Eurostat, 2017b).

A total of 366 thousand persons were granted refugee status in the EU-28 in 2016 at the first instance, 258 thousand were given subsidiary protection status, and 48 thousand were given authorization to stay for humanitarian reasons. According to Eurostat (Eurostat, 2017b) in 2016, three fifths (61%) of EU-28 first instance asylum decisions resulted in positive outcomes, meaning granting the status of refugee or subsidiary protection, or an authorization to stay for humanitarian reasons. For first instance decisions, some 54% of all positive decisions in the EU-28 in 2016 resulted in grants of refugee status. A total of 366 000 persons were granted refugee status in the EU-28 in 2016 at first instance, 258

⁸ In comparison, in 1992 the EU Member States received 672 thousand applications in the EU-15. Most of them from former Yugoslavia (Eurostat, 2017a)

Figure 1 – Distribution of first instance decisions on (non-EU) asylum applications in 2016




(Eurostat, 2017a)

000 were given subsidiary protection status, and 48 000 were given authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons. Figure 1 provides an analysis of the outcome of first instance decisions. This means that there is a significant difference between the asylum seekers and those that actually receive a refugee status, including all the rights that are attached to being a refugee. Figure 1 is interesting because it compares the EU member states' migration regimes with regard to the recognition of refugees or those in need of subsidiary protection. It becomes clear that Germany rejects slightly more applications than Sweden but grants more refugee status than Sweden. Italy can be seen to reject a very large number of applications and grants very little refugee that status. More migrants are taken in for humanitarian reasons and subsidiary protection than for asylum reasons. France can be seen to reject even more applications than Italy. However the refugee status is distributed more commonly than in Italy. It is clear that the contemporary migration regimes of the four countries discussed in this thesis deal with refugees and asylum in different ways.

Considering the four countries of interest to this thesis, it becomes clear that all four take up particular positions within the European migration regime. Considering

Figure 2 – Number of (non-EU) asylum seekers in the EU and EFTA Member States in 2015 and 2016



(Eurostat, 2017a)

Figure 2 the number of first time asylum applicants in Germany increased from 442 thousand in 2015 to 722 thousand in 2016. Italy also reported large increases. Conversely, Sweden's shares of the EU-28 total each fell more than 10% between 2015 and 2016. As can be shown in Figure 2, Germany, Italy and France have all experienced an increase in asylum seekers while Sweden, in the other hand, has experienced a decrease.

2.3.3 European policies in course of the crisis of migration

The crisis of migration and especially of refugees to Europe has spurred reactions among European leaders. I argue that it is not possible to distinguish a coherent strategic response on a European level. This is one of the characteristics of a certain migration regime being in a crisis. There are, nevertheless, attempts to create a common migration strategy in Europe. These attempts include measures taken to secure the external borders of the European Union. There have been negotiations trying to strengthen the borders of so called transition countries in order to prevent migrants from entering European waters. This concerns mainly Northern African states and recently also Turkey. I will give a description of both dynamics. It is important to understand the dynamics of European migration policies in response to the migration crisis in order to contextualize the four countries I am focusing on in this thesis. Germany, Sweden, France and Italy not only

maneuver within the European framework, they also actively shape the European migration policies. Documents by the European Commission will serve as a means of analyzing European migration policies.

2.3.3.1 Returns as a means of controlling migration

A main aim of European leaders has been to focus on returns. This is supposed to uphold the image that the states and the EU are in control of the migration flows. In March 2016 the EU reached a deal with Turkey that allows a quick return of unauthorized migrants, especially from Greece, to Turkey. Similar deals are being negotiated with other countries. Sweden and Germany and the European Union in 2016 all signed readmission agreements with Afghanistan intended to facilitate the return of large numbers of Afghan nationals. A new terminal is reportedly in the works at the Kabul airport in order to accommodate the large numbers of migrants expected to be sent back. The Afghanistan agreements—and similar ones being negotiated with Nigeria, Jordan, and Tunisia and recently concluded with Mali—mark a pronounced shift in approach as migration has worked its way up to the highest levels of national and EU foreign policy agendas. This means that migration policies have far reaching geo-political implications. European countries seek to obtain these deals by offering facilitated visa procedures or trade incentives in return. “Policymakers everywhere have become increasingly aware of the need to pair protection and integration with investments in the capacity to manage flows, a crucial part of upholding trust in the migration system. In Europe, governments have turned their attention to returns, partly in an effort to deter unauthorized entries and unfounded claims” (PAPADEMETRIOU; FRATZKE, 2016).

It is clear that European leaders are in need of demonstrating that they are in control of the migration –situation. Especially combating irregular migration into the EU seems an important priority⁹

2.3.3.2 Externalizing European borders

Even though the European member states are divided on internal migration policies, they are surprisingly united when it comes to the external migration policies with third countries. “Despite widespread disunity on migration issues between EU Member

⁹ The European Commission states that: “As regards the medium and long term, the Commission proposes guidelines in four policy areas: reducing incentives for irregular immigration; border management – saving lives and securing external borders; developing a sound common asylum policy based on the implementation of Europe’s Common European Asylum System, but also assessing and, possibly, revising the Dublin Regulation in 2016; lastly, establishing a new policy on regular immigration, modernising and revising the ‘blue card’ system, setting fresh priorities for integration policies and optimising the benefits of migration policy for the individuals concerned and for countries of origin, for example by facilitating cheaper, faster and more secure remittance transfers“(European Council, 2017).

States, there is a rare consensus regarding the urgency and necessity of halting Central Mediterranean migration...” (COLLETT, 2017).

The documents of the European Commission from June 2016 confirm this approach. In the Communication on the progress of the partnership framework with third countries, the European Commission clearly states that they will work closely with third countries in order to hinder irregular migration. The countries that are mentioned are countries of origin of a large number of irregular migrants in Europe and so called transit countries. The document, however, also mentions refugees and seeks a closer relationship to countries that host a large number of refugees. Concerning Jordan, the Commission states: “The focus on strengthening the institutional and economic resilience of both countries while enhancing services and economic opportunities for Syrian refugees and host communities, through increased protection, access to employment, quality education and basic services. This has included an agreement with Jordan in July to simplify the rules of origin that Jordanian exporters use in their trade with the EU, making it easier to access the EU market, while helping Jordan find employment for the Syrian refugees in the country.” (European Union, 2016, 11). Trade incentives for Jordan are traded in order to facilitate the re-admission of irregular migrants to the country.

During the most recent informal European summit in Malta at the beginning of February 2017 (European Council, 2017) this policy approach towards migration and third countries was re-affirmed. The European leaders met to discuss how to stem the migration flow from Libya to Italy. This includes, mainly, strategies on how to prevent migrants leaving the Libyan coast to enter European waters. EU laws state that vessels that enter European waters need to be rescued and brought to the European territory where full European asylum laws apply. Therefore the member states of the EU are looking more closely at the so called “transition countries”. Their aim is to relocate the responsibility of rescue and search of migrants trying to cross the sea onto these countries, ultimately reducing the number of migrants that reach the EU.

Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt are being discussed as potential partners. Concerning Libya the EU is concentrating mainly on “equipping the Libyan government with the means to prevent maritime departures, pull back boats that depart, and offer stranded migrants a one-way ticket home” (COLLETT, 2017). Strengthening the Libyan coast guard is a main pillar of the strategy. The negotiations with Libya are less a deal than a relocation of financial support for certain operations and aims. Elisabeth Collett’s (COLLETT, 2017) analysis of the envisaged approach towards Libya is very skeptical: “Unfortunately, EU leaders cannot afford to publicly acknowledge a blunt truth: that Libya will not be able to do much of what is being asked of it. The European Union is negotiating with

a government that does not have a strong hold on the country.“ Additionally there are no significant plans to aid and protect migrants stranded in Libya. Detention centers in Libya have been described as inadequate and inhumane.

Another country the EU heads of state have considered is Tunisia. Here again, the EU member states want Tunisia to help prevent migrants from leaving the country. Tunisia, similar to Libya, does not have adequate infrastructure for a large number of migrants. The camps that held migrants from Libya were run by the UNHCR and have recently been dismantled. Other countries that the EU leaders are negotiating with include Egypt and Algeria (COLLETT, 2017).

2.3.3.3 The EU-Turkey Agreement

The EU-Turkey agreement deserves special attention since it is a unique attempt by European leaders to hinder asylum seekers from entering European territory. The number of refugees residing in Turkey has gone up considerably. In 2016 about three million refugees were registered in Turkey, of which 2.7 million are Syrian nationals. The second and third largest groups were Iraqi and Afghan citizens.

47% of the Syrian refugees are under the age of 18. Another interesting fact is that the overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees live in urban communities and only 9% live in camps. About half of the 2.7 million refugees live in the city of Istanbul. The surge in the number of refugees that Turkey is hosting has given Turkey considerable political leverage in negotiations with the European Union. Given the increased concern of irregular migration into the EU, European leaders have sought to strike a deal with Turkey in order to stem the inflow of migrants.

An important milestone is the EU-Turkey deal concluded in March 2016. Irregular migrants, including refugees, arriving in Greece can be sent back to Turkey, according to the deal. In return Europe obliges itself to take in a Syrian refugee for each Syrian that has been returned to Turkey. However, this number has been capped at 72,000, far short of the 108 000 a year recommended by international aid agencies. Additionally the EU-accession talks with Turkey have been “re-energized” and the EU is looking into easing visa requirements for Turkish citizens¹⁰ (RANKIN, 2016).

The deal has been heavily criticized by NGOs and civil society organizations. Marie Elisabeth Ingres, the head of mission of Doctors Without Borders in Greece published the following statement after the EU-Turkey deal was reached in March 2016: “We made

¹⁰ The political ties and conflicts with Turkey have changed recently. The status of this analysis is April 2017.

the extremely difficult decision to end our activities in Moria because continuing to work inside would make us complicit in a system we consider to be both unfair and inhuman. We will not allow our assistance to be instrumentalized for a mass expulsion operation, and we refuse to be part of a system that has no regard for the humanitarian or protection needs of asylum seekers and migrants“ (ARRUZZA, 2016).

Additionally Turkey has been widely criticized for its treatment of migrants and refugees. “To make things even worse, according to Amnesty International, Turkey is currently illegally returning thousands of Syrian refugees to Syria. De facto, through its agreement with Turkey, the EU is about to send thousands of refugees to the slaughterhouse“ (ARRUZZA, 2016).

2.3.3.4 The Suspension of the Schengen Area

The suspension of parts of the Schengen area¹¹ is an important aspect to the crisis of the migration regime. Even though my thesis analyzes four countries of the European Union, it is important to comprehend the entire picture of parts of the suspension of the Schengen area. Therefore I will refer to several European Union countries that have been responsible for the implementation of border controls within the EU.

France, Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Great Britain and Norway have all partly suspended the free movement of individuals across their borders. Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Norway have all announced to keep up border controls until at least May 2017 (European Council, 2017). Other member states have taken even more drastic steps in an attempt to stifle migration. Hungary has constructed a fence on its border to Serbia, leaving migrants stranded on the border (ARRUZZA, 2016). In the beginning of the march 2017 the Hungarian government approved the installation of movement-sensors on the fence that seals off the border to Serbia. The country’s president Vitor Orban said “migration is the Trojan horse of terrorism” (VERSECK, 2017).

2.3.4 The policy responses in Sweden

Sweden has been governed by a minority government, which includes the Green Party, since September 2014. Policy responses to the migration crisis were marked by the sharp rise in support for the anti-immigration Sweden Democrats which are currently the third strongest party in the county. Sweden has passed several repressive laws in order to stem the influx of migrants and refugees.

¹¹ The Schengen Area is an area comprising 26 European states that have officially abolished passport and all other types of border control at their mutual borders.

In 2015 16,8% of the population were immigrants. Of the immigrant population 50,6% were women (??). The Swedish Migration Agency, a government department responsible for processing claims, introduced tougher rules in July 2016, designed to deter and keep out asylum seekers. Sweden introduced border controls and therefore made it harder for migrants to enter in the first place. Additionally, stricter rules surrounding family reunion were put in place. Yet another measure was withdrawing housing for failed asylum seekers and the expansion of immigration detention (MOORE, 2016).

Furthermore the Swedish government has started to concentrate on the encouragement of returns. Currently, the Swedish government pays 3 911 Euros to individuals that leave the country and 9 611 Euros to families that decide to go back to their original country. This, together with other measures, has led to the number of asylum applications dropping in Sweden (ENGLAND, 2016).

The Swedish government is in need to demonstrate that their strategy is working. In this sense the official website of Immigration to Sweden states that „The number of asylum seekers dropped dramatically – from 163 000 in the peak year of 2015 to 29 000 – much due to changes in Swedish migration laws“ (Official Website of Immigration to Sweden, 2017).

2.3.5 The policy responses in Germany

The current situation in Germany is marked by several dynamics. The „Summer of Migration“ in 2015 started an important dynamic in the migration policy of the country. After the end of the “Summer of Migration” in 2015, the responses of the government towards migration and towards refugees was geared towards giving the public the impression that they are in control of the situation. This resulted in several more repressive measures. In order to put migration into a comparative perspective to the other three countries of interest to this thesis, it is important to note that in 2015 14,9% of the population were immigrants. Of these immigrants, 52,4% were women (??).

In the summer of 2015 the German Chancellor Merkel offered temporary asylum to refugees, prompting a mass movement of people through the Balkan states towards Germany in autumn and winter. Borders were declared open and images of thousands of migrants making their way from Greece to the Balkans, then to Austria and Germany dominated the media. The German head of state, Merkel, gave a speech welcoming refugees to Germany. Among the arrivals of the migrants a *Willkommenskultur* (literally welcoming culture) emerged. A civil society movement emerged taking food and clothes to the camps, taking refugees to meetings with the authorities in their own cars, paying their fares, teaching German, translating forms, sharing couches and bikes and opening up soc-

cer clubs, schools and kindergartens for refugee kids (AKRAP, 2015). “In Germany, we are seeing thousands of people who were never politically active but who suddenly decide that it is their mission to help out with refugees” (BUCKEL, 2016).

Soon after the „Summer of Migration“ in 2015, particularly conservative forces in Germany called for more control and for a stop to the open door policy. The extreme right party in Germany, AfD, was elected into several regional parliaments giving xenophobic discourses more visibility. Another turning point in the public debate about migration was New Years Eve of 2016 when the main German media outlets took up a story of a group of migrants harassing women. Subsequently the image of menacing migrant men that “swamp” the country emerged. A famous liberal feminist, Alice Schwarzer, brought the term “sex wars” into the discourse, further nurturing racist sentiments in the German society (HESS *et al.*, 2016).

On a political level, several repressive measures have been implemented in order to stop migrants from coming to Germany. New asylum legislations make it more difficult to obtain a refugee status and new law on integration make it more difficult to receive a residence permit. Additionally, the closure of the Balkan route and the reinstallation of border controls make it harder for migrants to enter the country. The recent discussion to consider Afghanistan as a “secure” country of origin would make it possible to deport migrants to Afghanistan¹² (HESS *et al.*, 2016). The German government has made a point to prove that they have managed to halt the large numbers of migrants coming to the country. Germany has claimed that in 2016 280,000 asylum seekers arrived which is a drop of more than 600,000 compared to the previous year (??). The upcoming elections in fall have made it particularly important for the government to insist that they have regained control over the situation of migration into Germany.

2.3.6 The policy responses in Italy

The current migration situation in Italy is marked by its Southern border being an entrance to the European Union for many migrants, by migrant riots and by the unstable domestic political situation.

On a political level, Italy saw the long-term right winged Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi ousted from office and an interim Prime Minister Renzi take office for two years (2014 - 2016). The current Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni was voted into office in December 2016. The ongoing Mediterranean refugee and migration crisis is on the very top of the current government’s agenda. While most routes to Europe have been closed in the meantime,

¹² There has been large criticism of this intent, showing that Afghanistan is far from being a safe country (TAZ, 2016)

among them the Balkan route and the Greek border with Turkey, the coastlines of Italy, which stretch more than 7,600 km and are difficult to control for the European border agency FRONTEX, remain an entrance for migrants (BENEDIKTER; KAROLEWSKI, 2017).

Within the European Union, Italy has repeatedly lobbied to have exceptions of the strict rules on government debt. In October 2016, the Minister for Economy and Finance Pier Carlo Padoan estimated that Italy will have to spend at least 3.8bn euros on refugees and migrants in 2017 alone, which according to Padoan was the most conservative estimate under “stable circumstances”. Any increase in the number of refugees and ongoing EU passivity would cost Italy at least around 4.2bn euros. Italy has warned that this could lead to the breach of EU fiscal rules, as Italy’s 2017 deficit would rise to 3.2 per cent. However, especially the German government has interpreted this as an attempt for Italy for undermine the deficit rules and has therefore been the main country to block Italy’s attempts to opt out of the deficit rules due to the migration situation (BENEDIKTER; KAROLEWSKI, 2017).

There have been several refugee riots in southern Italy after the closing of the Balkan migration route in the beginning of 2016. Refugees that are registered in Italy wait an average of 18 months for their asylum applications to be processed. Additionally the Mafia Costa Nostra has been dominating refugee-related services in the South of Italy. The services provided to the largest camp in Europe CARA Mineo are believed to be run by mafia related businesses that intimidated other contractors to opt out of the bidding process. Furthermore “the Mafia-affiliated cleaning and catering operations that won the bids are providing lower-quality services than the legitimate ones would have, thereby driving up their margins” (POLIZER; KASSIE, 2016) Unsurprisingly, the mafia is also involved in human trafficking and in smuggling migrants across the Mediterranean and from South to Northern Italy (POLIZER; KASSIE, 2016).

Also the promise to relocate refugees from Italy to other European countries failed, with only 560 people instead of the originally declared 39,600 transferred to other EU nations by autumn 2016 (BENEDIKTER; KAROLEWSKI, 2017).

2.3.7 The policy responses in France

The main and most relevant events in France during the so called migration crisis were on the one hand the demolition of the Calais Camp in the North of France with all its consequences and the Presidential elections that took place in May. The far right party “Front National” has increasingly gained support in France. In the polls before the French Presidential elections, the FN was even placed first at times. Due to this pressure

from the far right, the Socialist President of the Republic tried to demonstrate that he is in control of the migration situation and that he is putting policies into place that will decrease migration to France.

In 2015 12,1% of the population were immigrants. Of the immigrants in France 51,4% were women (??). After pressure from local inhabitants, lorry drivers and the UK government, the French President Hollande vowed to close the makeshift camp of migrants and refugees called „the jungle“. The migrants living in "the Jungle" on the edge of Calais, attempted to cross the tunnel to get into the UK. They tried to stow away on lorries headed for Eurotunnel, or jump or cut security fences to try to hide on Eurotunnel trains themselves. They also tried to board lorries bound for cross-Channel ferries. This led to protests of French lorry drivers. The UK also tightened security at the entrance of the tunnel in an attempt to close off this route for migrants to enter the country. At the moment of the closure of the camp an estimated 9000 migrants were living there (BBC, 2015). In 2016 The French government demolished the camp and relocated some of the former residents.

However, after the demolition of the Jungle in Calais, many refugees and migrants started camping on the streets of Paris. Metro stops in Paris became sheltered camps for migrants. The metro stop „Stalingrad“ was the home to about 100 migrants. After pressure from mostly business elites, the mayor of Paris opened a migrant shelter for 400 men. The city's police has also been part of the effort to clear the capital of hundreds of improvised camps. Many migrants have now been pushed to the outskirts of the city (PISER, 2016).

Another measure taken by the French government was to offer cash to migrants who return to their country of origin. 2500 Euros was offered as well as a plane ticket and financial help to set up a business in their home country if they leave before the end of 2016 (BULMAN, 2016). This measure had more symbolic character than an actual effect on migration itself and needs to be seen in the context of the then upcoming Presidential elections.

2.4 Conclusion of Chapter 2

In this chapter I have given an overview of the historical development of the migration regimes in Europe, with specific focus on Germany, Italy, Sweden and France. This chapter has enabled me to establish a comparative perspective of these four countries. By embedding the narration of migration in these four countries into a general European framework, it was possible to analyze differences and similar dynamics concerning migra-

tion.

The Fordist migration regime was marked by a mixture of guest-worker programs and colonial ties in the four countries I consider in this thesis. Migration was key to economic reconstruction in Germany, France, Italy and Sweden after the Second World War. In Germany, the guest worker regime was highly organized, with official recruitment strategies by the government and bilateral agreements with numerous countries to facilitate labor migration. Sweden was marked by a similar dynamic. The country was also strongly in need of labor migration, even if at an earlier period than Germany. The Swedish government facilitated immigration, attracting mainly migrants from the neighboring countries, notably Finland. The trade unions played an important role in the organization of labor migration to the country, hindering the undercutting of social standards. Here, Sweden stands out as the only country of the four that are of concern to my thesis, where trade unions play a substantial role in the organization of the guest worker regime. In France, similarly, migrant workers played an important role in the economy after World War Two. The French government and French companies recruited guest workers abroad. A specificity of the French Fordist migration regime is marked by (post) colonial ties. These (post) colonial ties led to a dynamic where illegalized migration was an accepted part of the migration regime and a phase many migrants passed through before being in a regularized situation. Even though Italy primarily served as an emigration country in Europe, the internal migration has many similarities to the immigration to Germany, Sweden and France. The South of Italy served as a labor supplier to the North of the country. Even though they were part of the same country, the migrants from Southern Italy faced many similar challenges in the North. However, an important difference to the guest-worker regimes of the other three countries is that the Southern Italian migrants were citizens of Italy and therefore possessed all the rights associated with citizenship.

In the 1970s Sweden (1972), Germany (1973) and France (1974) officially stopped their labor recruitment programs and shifted towards a “zero migration” policy. The dominant form of migration was thereafter organized through family reunification and through asylum. Italy stands slightly apart from the other three countries. The neoliberal migration regime also marks the first time international migration became an issue for the country. Nevertheless, the same characteristics apply to the neoliberal migration in Italy. Illegalized immigration became more and more common in the all four countries, whereas it was the strongest in France and Italy. Starting from the 1990s onwards a Europeanization of migration policies can be observed. This was accompanied by yet another shift in the migration regime – away from the zero migration policies towards a selective opening towards labor migrants. The EU enlargement in 2004 led to labor migration within the European Union from Eastern European countries to Western and Northern European

countries. In Germany the specific form of managed migration entered into force with a new piece of legislation in 2005, simplifying access to the labor market for highly qualified migrants. In France the Loi Hortefeux enabled employers to apply for a work and residence permit for their employees and in Sweden a law on “labor immigration” was passed in 2008, expanding labor migration to the country. The Turco-Napolitano law in 1998 and later the Bossi Fini law in 2002 was the first attempt of the Italian government to implement a sort of managed migration. The Dublin regulations mark a Europeanization of the asylum aspect of the migration regime. Another factor that has been relevant in Sweden, Germany, France and Italy alike is that on the level of discourse, asylum seekers and migrants have been linked to negative aspects of society. Especially asylum seekers have featured prominently as the “other”. The rise in racist sentiments and attacks can be registered in all four countries. In Germany, housing for asylum seekers was set on fire. In France an intense discussion about republican values and secularism cemented the otherness of migrants. In Sweden, very similar to Germany, refugee camps were set on fire by underground right winged groups.

Currently, the migration regime in all four countries is faced with increased asylum-migration. Germany, Italy and France have all experienced an increase in first time asylum applications between 2015 and 2016. While Sweden has experienced a decrease, it was still among the number one countries to receive asylum seekers in 2015. The current situation has prompted reactions on a European level such as attempts to further externalize the European borders with deals such as the one with Turkey. However a common European response has not been strong enough or coherent enough. Several European Member States have reinstalled their borders, leading to a suspension of the Schengen area. For Italy this has meant a permanent struggle with the other European states about deficit rules and relocation programs. Due to its geographical location Italy has become a transit country, leading to the participation of the mafia in handling refugee related infrastructure in the South of the country. Germany experienced a drastic shift from a Willkommenskultur to more restrictive measures, trying to decrease the number of refugees arriving. Similarly, Sweden has also shifted from being a very open country towards refugees to implementing policies that are supposed to quench asylum seekers from coming. France has taken the drastic step of literally dismantling a large migrant camp in the North of country. By offering an amount of money to returning migrants, France hopes to push asylum seekers and migrants away.

3 Challenges of Contemporary Migration and Trade Unions

This chapter aims to analyze the relationship between immigration and the labor movement. I will firstly briefly describe the Keynes' view of employment and his concept of "involuntary unemployment". This author's approach had significant impacts on the labor movements in Western Europe and on trade unions. I will briefly outline the debate on the effect of migration for the labor market. Subsequently the differing trade union traditions in Western Europe will be discussed. The four countries of interest to this thesis, Italy, Germany, France and Sweden can each be identified as having a diverging approach to trade unionism. In order to comprehend how the trade unions of each country take up a position and struggle for workers rights it is important to grasp the industrial relations of each country. In the case of Germany and Sweden, there is a strong institutional incorporation of the trade unions into policy making. In Italy and France the trade union movement is able to influence the government by mobilizations. Ultimately, I will discuss the relationship between trade unions and migrants. Firstly, I review the existing literature on the topic and the main contradictions in the relationship between immigrants and trade unions. Then, I will analyze the four countries I have chosen for this thesis separately. I give a brief historical account of the trade union's positions on migration and then concentrate on moments that have changed the trade union's positions, actions and perspectives. I focus largely on the last decade. Final conclusions of this chapter will bring together the theoretical assumptions of Keynes, the traditions of the industrial relations of each country and its consequences for the trade union's approaches and positions towards immigrants in their country.

The analysis of the trade unions of Italy, Germany, France and Sweden will be focused mainly on the confederations. For Italy I choose to concentrate mainly (but not solely) on the trade union CGIL, given that it is the largest. The German trade union confederation, DGB, serves as the main example for trade union actions in Germany. However, the sectorial trade unions Ver.di and IG Metall are mentioned since they have been at the forefront of a changing attitude towards migrants. These two sectorial trade unions are also the most influential in the German Trade Union Confederation. In France, the CGT is subject to my research. It is the largest trade union confederation in France and has spearheaded strikes of illegalized immigrants in the country. The trade union confederation LO-Sweden is represented in my country example of Sweden as it is the largest confederation of the country and has featured the most prominently in influencing immigration policies.

3.1 Unemployment from a Keynesian Perspective

The following section will give an overview of the labor market and particularly unemployment from a Keynesian perspective. By contrasting Keynesian views to neo-classical approaches, I explain involuntary unemployment and why this was a theoretical shift. Understanding the basic points of the Keynesian concept of the labor market is important to comprehend strategic choices of the labor movements I am analyzing in this thesis. The trade union movement in Western Europe has internalized many of Keynes' approaches.

Keynes' labor market analysis is scattered throughout the pages of the *General Theory* (1936)(KEYNES, 2016). It must be said that even though Keynes contradicts the Classical Theory on a range of issues, he does see himself in their tradition: "A large part of the established body of economic doctrine I cannot but accept as broadly correct" (Keynes, 1987, 489). Keynes criticizes the main assumption of the Classical Theory: the notion of the Equilibrium. He states that in fact, the idea of an Equilibrium does not apply to all markets. In particular, it does not apply to the labor market. In Keynes' view the economy is not merely working to satisfy needs but first and foremost to make money. In this sense money is not neutral. Here again Keynes differs from the Classical Theory. "I am saying that booms and depressions are phenomena peculiar to an economy in which – in some significant sense which I am not attempting to define precisely in this place – money is not neutral" (KEYNES, 1987, 144). For him money is the goal of production, not production itself. Keynes also rejects the idea that workers and firms meet at the labor market on equal terms. For Keynes, companies possess significantly more power and are able to set prices and have the power to decide to employ workers or not to employ workers. He therefore introduced the idea that unemployment is a problem of macroeconomics and not a problem of the individual that is unemployed.

The theory that Keynes developed introduces two key variables: Investment and Consumption. Both are vital for the functioning of the economy and for employment. "The right course is to get rid of the scarcity of capital goods – which will rid us at the same time of most of the evils of capitalism – whilst also moving in the direction of increasing the share of income falling to those whose economic welfare will gain most by their having the chance to consume more" (KEYNES, 1987, 491). Spending decisions are crucial for the creation of employment according to the effective demand principle, which is a critical element of Keynes ideas. For Keynes employment is pivotal in a society and unemployment represents a moral problem. Therefore he, unlike the Classical Theory, assumes that involuntary unemployment does exist in a capitalist society and needs to be considered as a main challenge. Involuntary unemployment stems from a lack of investment in the real sphere. It originates in a deficient effective demand. This happens when the expected

money profit is too low. Given that Keynes identifies unemployment as a main problem of the capitalist society, he argues that the effective demand cannot be left to the market alone. Government interventions are essential. Here again, he contradicts Classical theories that assume that the market will regulate itself and is best left alone. Spending, so Keynes, creates income and employment. Keynes' central variable of Investment is linked to the creation of employment. Investment means investing in production and creating the capacities of production. This is closely linked to the notion of Consumption. "Consumption – to repeat the obvious – is the sole end and object of all economic activity. Opportunities for employment are necessarily limited by the extent of aggregate demand. Aggregate demand derives only from present consumption or from present provision for future consumption" (KEYNES, 2016). However, it must be noted that Consumption is not an autonomous spending decision, as it depends on income. Investment, as an autonomous spending decision, is more important for the creation of employment. Keynes considers involuntary unemployment a natural part of capitalist society. It is a result of the economic system working normally. However, he argues that it is necessary to limit unemployment within a society to a minimum.

In summary, the creation of employment was the main discussion for Keynes. He states that the employment creation is a decision taken by the entrepreneurs who are driven by their search for profits and by their expectations of sale. Keynes observes an asymmetry of power between entrepreneurs and workers. This had practical consequences for large parts of the labor movement in Europe. Given the asymmetrical power between entrepreneurs and workers, the necessity to empower workers through an organization such as trade unions is justified and much needed.

3.2 Contemporary Theories of Migration and the Labor Market

Most research that focuses on the effects of migration on the wages of workers that already reside in the country find that there is little to no impact. Some even find that there is actually a slightly positive effect for the wages of those already in the country of destination. One of the main concerns of trade unions is the development of wages and working conditions for their members. Given that the following chapter will analyze trade unions' positions of migration, it is important to review the existing literature on the topic of migration and wages.

Several academics (CATTANEO *et al.*, 2015), (DOCQUIER *et al.*, 2010), (FOGED; PERI, 2016), (MANACORDA *et al.*, 2012), have found that immigration has a positive effect on average native wages and reduces inequality. The main threat to wages as well as to inequality in Europe is emigration. This is because the highly educated tend to emigrate and

create a gap that is not easily filled. “Immigration to Europe was somewhat more beneficial to the non educated natives, reducing their wage gap with the highly educated, while the opposite is true of emigration. These surprising results imply that several European countries should begin to discuss more seriously the causes and effects of their significant emigration rates, especially of their highly educated professionals, rather than obsessing with immigration that has mostly been beneficial in economic terms”(DOCQUIER *et al.*, 2010). Docquier (DOCQUIER *et al.*, 2010) shows that during the period of 1990 until 2000 immigration has had zero until a slight positive effect on the wages of those already in the country. Immigration can have a positive on wages since it tends to move “native” workers (CATTANEO *et al.*, 2015) to higher skilled jobs. This upward mobility means that the wages for workers already in the country rise with a short delay of a year or two. The authors strictly contradict the crowding out theory of native workers by immigrants.

Similar conclusions have been made in research that scrutinized a specific European country. Foged (FOGED; PERI, 2016) analyzed immigrants that came to Denmark between 1991 and 2008 and assessed their influence on low skilled native workers. By analyzing longitude data they find that immigrants actually have a positive effect on native workers. Immigrants push native workers to less manual-intensive activities and therefore unskilled workers experience an upward mobility. “ We do not observe an increased probability of unemployment, nor a decrease in employment for unskilled natives”(FOGED; PERI, 2016, 29). Manacorda et al (MANACORDA *et al.*, 2012) conducted a study looking at the wage development with respect to immigration in the United Kingdom. They analyze data from the 1970s to the mid 2000s. By the mid 2000s the working age population that was born overseas was at 12% compared to 7% in the mid 1970s. The three authors find that immigration did not have an effect on the wages of native workers in the UK. The reason for this is that immigrant workers are imperfect substitutes in production for native workers of the same age group. The only sizable effect on wages can be found for the wages of already existing immigrants. They conclude that it is unclear if the same can be said for other OECD countries given that labor market structures vary from country to country. However, this is yet another paper that contradicts the common discourse that immigrants take away jobs of native workers and drive down wages.

3.2.1 Debate about the effect of current migration for Europe’s economies

There have been several studies trying to calculate the costs of migration and trying to make predictions on the effects of wages and the labor markets in Europe in general. Here, similar to the conclusions presented in the previous section, most agree that there will be no relevant effect on employment and wages of those already residing in the receiving countries. The current literature mostly agrees that migration is not a game-changer and has little effect on the GDP and wages.

I will briefly review the current academic debate and studies on the impact of the current refugees and immigrants that arrived in Europe. Interestingly, especially research conducted by international organizations stress the importance of migration and the very positive effects the current migration can have for the European countries. Not surprisingly, there is also a strand of research that makes the case for more and tighter restrictions on migration. These arguments are worth reviewing because they play a role in the public debate about migration in Europe.

The OECD Migration Outlook of 2016(OECD, 2016) stresses the impact of immigrants on public infrastructure and services. They conclude that “immigrants can exacerbate structural problems, notably in housing and education, it is generally not the source of these problems”. A recent paper published by the International Monetary Fund (AIYAR *et al.*, 2016) indicates that the unemployment of native workers will not rise due to the refugees and migrants that have come to Europe in the last two years. They state there will be a modest increase in GDP growth due to the fiscal expansion that is associated with the financial support asylum seekers and refugees receive. The policy recommendation of the IMF is to facilitate the labor market access for asylum seekers, refugees and migrants, and therefore making them contribute to public finances through taxes as soon as possible. Unfortunately, the IMF additionally argues that high minimum wages will hinder refugees from finding employment. This is similar to the debate about the minimum wage in Germany The lowering or suspension of minimum wages for refugees and company subsidies will incentivize employers.

Another study published by the IMF (JAUMOTTE *et al.*, 2016) in 2016 argues similarly but emphasizes even more strongly the gains in the GDP of host countries due to immigration. By raising the labor productivity immigrants have a significant impact on the countries they immigrate to: “1 percentage point increase in the share of migrants in the adult population can raise GDP per capita by up to 2 % in the long run” (Jaumontte *et al.*, 2016, 1). Given the ageing population in the “advanced economies” a migrant labor force can help sustain public finances. Furthermore both low and high skilled migrants can produce positive productivity effects given that their skills are complementary to those of native workers. The authors additionally stress that immigration benefits all income groups. The income per capita rises both at the top 10 % income the bottom 90 %. The Gini coefficient is not affected by immigration. This study by the IMF also includes a gender specific dimension, arguing that increased immigration leads to an increased labor market participation of native women. This is due to a greater availability of household and childcare possibilities provided by women. The study warns that if migrants are not able to integrate into the labor market this might create pressure on social

security systems and create social tensions that might lead to a political backlash against immigration. This study concludes that a rapid labor market integration of migrations is the key to reaping the gains. Language training, the recognition of skills of migrants and lower barriers to entrepreneurship should be introduced.


The strand of research that calls for tighter restrictions on migration argues that migration barriers in fact raise global economic efficiency. Reducing migration barriers could result in too much migration and therefore reducing efficiency by lowering productivity in high productivity places. This highly problematical strand of economic research sees low productivity as something that spreads from poor to rich countries and that migrants transmit through culture and institutions “like disease or pollution” (CLEMENS; PRITCHETT, 2016, 7). This is known as the “Epidemiological Model” that is propagated by Paul Collier, the best selling author of the book “Exodus: how migration is changing our world” and Oxford academic as a representative of this trend. Collier argues that there is a need to reduce migration significantly (CLEMENS; PRITCHETT, 2016). “However, the rate at which migrants are assimilating appears to be slower than had been expected. Immigrants have tended to cluster, and this reduces social interaction outside the group. Hence, after the surge in immigration since 1997, it may be sensible to have a temporary phase of slower immigration while we take stock of its social consequences. The economic consequences of a pause would be negligible as long as students were exempted.” (COLLIER, 2014). He appeals to the Left to “free us from the myth of the open door” (COLLIER, 2014).

The economic models and presumptions have been contradicted and proven wrong by numerous economists, showing that cultural diversity is positive for local markets or that areas with greater number of immigrants have experienced greater income growth. Clemens (CLEMENS; PRITCHETT, 2016) uses similar parameters as the advocates of the „Epidemiological Model“ and contradict their findings, arguing for a relaxation of immigration controls.

3.3 The Varieties of Trade Unionism in Europe

This section will present theories of trade unions in Europe and possibilities to conceptualize the different traditions that exist within the labor movements of Italy, Germany, France and Sweden. Hyman’s theory of trade unions (HYMAN, 2001) makes it possible to classify the trade unions in Western Europe within the triangle of Society, Market and Class. The varieties of trade unionism approach, which takes many of Hyman’s concepts into account, further enables the classification of the trade union traditions in Italy, Germany, France and Sweden.

Figure 3 – Trade Union Triangle from Hyman




(HYMAN, 2001)

Trade Unions are organizations that enable employees to protect themselves. Employees have certain interests to defend. One of these is the exchange of labor power for money and the other is labor process itself. Therefore trade unions deal with, on the one hand wage negotiations, sick pay etc. and on the other side also with working conditions and labor intensity and health and safety at the workplace. As an ultimate weapon in order to struggle or defend these interests, trade unions can use a strike. “A workers’ association which rejects the strike tactic altogether on principle, or never even threatens strike action, cannot really be considered a trade union” (LINDEN, 2008, 220). Trade Unions may criticize market relations and social power relations, however, “they also regulate and normalize the employment relationship” (HYMAN, 2001).

Apart from these unifying characteristics, a pluralism of trade unions exists in Europe. This is due to different definitions of the very nature of trade unions, varying concepts of the purpose of collective organization and differences in strategies and tactics. This has shaped trade union members, their ideological standpoints, and power resources they apply and cultivate. In this sense Hyman (HYMAN, 2001) identifies three different ideal types of European trade unionism: Unions with primarily labor market functions, unions as means of raising workers’ status in society, and unions as proponents of the struggle between labor and capital.

As graph 3 indicates, all trade unions need to position themselves in between these three points of reference. The first point of reference, the market implies the regulation of the wage – labor relationship. Since trade unions represent employees, this is one of their

Figure 4 – Trade Union Density Sweden, Germany, Italy, France



main concerns and therefore the market is important. The second, class, means that trade unions are inevitably agencies of class. The third, society, represents the specific social framework that constrains trade union's choices and actions. In Western Europe trade unions tend to be oriented towards one side of the triangle, meaning that they position themselves mainly between two points. Each side of the triangle implies its own contradictions.

Figure 4 indicates the trade union density¹ in Sweden, Germany, Italy and France from 1960 until 2013. In all four countries trade union density has decreased. However, the moment trade union density went down considerably differs as well as the extent of the decrease. The following sections will discuss the development of the industrial relations of the four countries.

3.3.1 Industrial relations in Sweden

Swedish industrial relations have been dominated by collective agreements, co-operation, self-regulation and a combination of centralization and decentralization. The varieties of trade unionism approach classifies Sweden as a Nordic industrial relations type with an institutionalized class compromise and a very high level of unionization (see previous section). Swedish trade unions still possess a very high union density rate (in 2007 73 %). The 1980s and 1990s and 2000s were marked by employers' offensives to undermine trade unions power by reforming union-led unemployment funds.

In Sweden, a very distinctive route to integrative trade unionism was followed. Given

¹ Trade union density corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members, divided by the total number of wage and salary earners (OECD Labour Force Statistics). Density is calculated using survey data, wherever possible, and administrative data adjusted for non-active and self-employed members otherwise (OECD, 2017).

that Sweden was a neutral country in the First World War, the workers movement was spared the divisions over its position to the First World War, as was the case in the other European countries. Both the Social Democratic Party (SAP) and the central trade union confederation (LO) had a close organic relationship. The workers movement was weak well into the 20th century due to the small industry in the country. The Social Democratic Party entered into government in 1932 and stayed in government non-stop until 1976. This continuity explains the development of an extensive welfare state and very stable industrial relations. Peak level bargaining between the LO and the employers' organization SAF² were a fundamental part of the industrial relations (HYMAN, 2001, 47). Another important aspect of Swedish industrial relations is the division between blue-collar trade unions and white-collar trade unions. White-collar workers possess separate confederations (SAOC and TCO), making the recruitment for each confederation homogenous.

The basis for the legal framework of the industrial relations was set in the 1930s and established an extensive collective bargaining system that made state regulations superfluous. The main trade union confederation, LO, was very much opposed to the idea of any state interference in industrial relations. This system proved effective from the very start. In 1930 already 80 % of all industrial workers in Sweden were covered by collective agreements. The LO Sweden started centralizing its structures in the 1940s, depriving members of voting rights regarding collective agreements. "One aim of centralization was to curb the influence of communists, who wielded power in LO unions organizing seamen, paper workers and building workers, all of which were involved in militant wage struggles and labor market conflicts during the depression years of the 1930s" (KJELLBERG, 2009). The extensive autonomy of the trade unions to negotiate the terms under which workers should work in the labor market can also be seen in the union's implications in the guest worker program. As described in the previous section local unions and employers compromised on how much labor the local economy was in need of.

The LO Sweden opened up more democratic membership participation in the 1970s, due to pressure from the student movement and from a series of wild strikes at the state owned mining company LKAB in the years 1969 -1970. More direct negotiations at the workplace were able to take place and union officers at local branches were guaranteed access to workplaces. This was an important right for small workplaces without union representatives. The 1970s additionally marked a period of a series of labor laws that were passed by the government to guarantee employment protection. Even though the labor legislation that was passed meant a departure from the classic Swedish model of self-regulation, it can still be considered as a continuation of the industrial relations since most laws were only framework laws that were meant to be implemented by collective

² SAF (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen) is the Swedish employer's organization.

agreements (KJELLBERG, 2009).

The 1980s and 1990s saw a rise in unemployment and therefore also a decline in trade union power (see 2.2.3). The Swedish Employers organizations repeatedly called for legislation restricting conflict rights. The largest coup to diminish trade union rights was however introduced in 2007 with a new law that brought about profound changes in the unemployment insurance. Union run funds have a long history in Sweden and are an integral part of the trade union system³ The changes introduced by the center-right government meant that the trade union had to raise their fees considerably. “Large numbers of members experienced a six fold net increase” (KJELLBERG, 2009). Due to this the union-led funds lost about 10% of their members.

3.3.2 Industrial relations in Germany

The Industrial relations in Germany are a product of the second half of the twentieth century. As explained in the previous section, the German trade union tradition is marked by traditions of social partnership and formal tripartite institutions (see 2.1.2). Trade Unions were seen as forces for social integration and with the duty to avoid the cleavages that were destructive during the Weimar Republic. Immediately after the end of the Second World War The BRD – *Bundesrepublik Deutschland* - was constituted in the West and the DDR - *Deutsche Demokratische Republik* – in the East. Given that the construction of industrial relations in the BRD were relevant for the further development of trade unions even after the unification of Germany, I will concentrate on the BRD.

On the trade union side, the principle of trade union unity, meaning a single union in each workplace was dominant. The German Confederation (DGB) of Trade Unions consisted of several sectorial unions. The unions were largely run by social democrats. Industrial relations in the 1950s and 1960s were dominated by collective bargaining. The concept of a social market economy persisted and became an equivalent to the idea of organized capitalism. Part of this concept was the autonomy of unions and employer’s organizations as bargaining partners. “The Keynesian compromise in which growth, full employment and price stability were underwritten by government economic policy established the preconditions for sectoral unions to pursue successfully their core bargaining functions” (HYMAN, 2001, 121).

The late 1960s and 1970s saw a resurgence of class conflict in all of Europe. The BRD experienced an upsurge in spontaneous strikes, especially against the falling real wages and the intensification of work pressure. This had consequences for the trade union move-

³ It must be noted that workers can be affiliated to a fund and not to a trade union. In 2007 every seventh member of a union-led unemployment fund was not a union member (HYMAN, 2001, 91).

ment. “A central focus of dissent in many of the disputes was the fact that workplace productivity coalitions often excluded many sections of the working class: women, migrant workers and the lower- skilled “ (HYMAN, 2001, 124). The reactions of the trade union leadership to this upsurge were ambivalent. One aspect was to discipline shop-floor activists that were suspected of communist sympathies. On the other hand trade union leaders had to demonstrate that they were willing to be tough and radical in order to avoid being outflanked by workplace militants as a consequence. Wage bargaining was now accompanied by negotiations about qualitative demands concerning working conditions (HYMAN, 2001).

The 1980s were marked by a sharp decline in trade union members. However, given that de-industrialization was a lot less marked in Germany, the process of trade unions’ decreasing power was felt less sharply than in other countries of Western Europe (HYMAN, 2001, 127). The 1980s nevertheless posed several challenges to industrial relations and especially to trade unions in Germany. The German trade unions didn’t adapt quickly to the changing profile of the labor force as a whole and remained predominantly organizations of male manual workers. During the 1980s, serious scandals were unrolled surrounding unions’ business activities. The unions’ property agency *Neue Heimat*⁴ collapsed spectacularly, damaging the DGB’s public image and esteem. Additionally, there was deterioration in the labor market and a strong increase in unemployment. While unemployment had only been around 1 % in the 1970s, it rose to 9 % in 1983. Furthermore the labor market became polarized between a core workforce and a periphery of lower skilled workers. The employers adopted a more offensive strategy and insisted on flexibility in the work organization pushing the trade unions into a defensive position. The next marking point of the 1980s was the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The DDR became part of the BRD resulting in a rapid deindustrialization of Eastern Germany and a surge in unemployment (16% in 1992). The Eastern trade unions were dissolved and their former members were encouraged to join the *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (DGB) which led to a surge in trade union membership. The problem of the rise in unemployment persisted throughout most the 1990s. The labor market continued to shift with a rise in temporary employment and the emergence of the two-labor market with a core labor force and marginalized workers (HYMAN, 2001). As I argued this can be seen as a neoliberal shift in Germany and the connected shift in power relations in favor of those in power (see 2.2.4). By the end of the 1990s the German industrial relations were characterized by fragmentation and heterogeneity. The formal institutions of the traditional system remained in place but their regulatory effect had been significantly reduced (HYMAN, 2001, 134).

⁴ *Neue Heimat* is the DGB’s property agency. It was a corporate building company owned by the German Trade Union Confederation. The scandal involved that several leading trade unionists had enriched themselves through the rents this agency recieved. Additionally it was heavily indepted.

The emergence of a coalition government between Social Democrats and the Green Party in 1998 marked yet another turning point. A deputy leader of the metal workers union *IG Metall*, Walter Riester, became minister of labor. The government was committed to several positive actions that the trade unions agreed with. However they did not deliver on their immediate commitments. It soon turned out the Red-Green government followed a Tony Blair 3rd way path, further implementing neoliberal policies, tightening budgetary discipline and “modernizing” the welfare state. This implied far-reaching reforms of the welfare system, especially concerning unemployment benefits. The so call *Hartz IV reforms* were intended to sanction long- term unemployed unwilling to work. This drastic reduction for many of the unemployed was accompanied by increased pressure on them to accept any kind of job offered. If people refused or were unable to keep up with requirements made by job centers they were threatened with sanctions (The Economist, 2004). Extensive protests followed and led to a split in the Social Democratic party and to the creation of a new left winged party *Die Linke*. The mentioned reforms strained the relationship between trade unions and the Social Democratic party for the following years. This has been loosened up after the end of the Red-Green government.

3.3.3 Industrial relations in Italy

The Italian industrial relations are part of the Southern European group that is characterized by ideologically divided labor movements where labor regulation is depended on state legislation. The main trade union confederation *Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro* (CGIL) was created in 1944 by representatives of the communist, the socialist and the catholic movements. The trade union movement and the industrial relations in Italy were thereafter marked by splits within the trade union movement mostly sparked by different approaches to the challenges they were facing.

The initial unity of the trade union movement was only short-lived. The Christian oriented labor movement (CISL) split off as well as the social democratic and republican tendencies (UIL). The CGIL however remained the largest trade union and was closely associated to the Communist Party which was one of the reasons why the United States strongly encouraged the mentioned splits in the climate of the Cold War⁵. In the two decades after the end of the Second World War, the Italian trade unions possessed a significant public status. Components of the social insurance system were administered by tripartite boards and the public sector trade unions participated in a network of regulatory committees. This implied that the Italian trade unions were embedded as components of the social order. They mixed anti-capitalist resistance with integrative functions in society. All three

⁵ However the CGIL was not entirely affiliated to the Communist Party. Until the 1991 there were officially two currents within the CGIL: Communist and Socialist. The Communists compsed 2/3 of the CGIL and the Socialists 1/3.

trade unions were implicated in a series of company agreements that were usually negotiated by full-time officials (rather than workplace representatives).

The end of the 1960s and the 1970s were marked by an escalation of industrial militancy. There was broad discontent with conditions of the factory regime, the intensification of work and the cost of urban living. Even though the official confederations had not initiated the revolts, “they rode the strike wave and were its main beneficiary. Membership increased rapidly: by the late 1970s roughly half of all Italian employees were unionized” (??)Hyman2001. This increase in membership and in workers’ militancy led to a shift in the bargaining power of the confederations leading them to negotiate considerable improvements for the workers. The bargaining aims even surpassed the narrow realm of the workplace and included demands such as the costs of housing and transport. Trade unions added legitimacy to the process of governance.

Towards the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s the power relations changed dramatically. The Italian economy entered a crisis with high inflation and mounting unemployment. The Italian trade union developments of the time can be seen as “a strategic shift from class oppositions to political exchange and social partnership” (HYMAN, 2001, 151). Unions tried to at least moderate the pace of the erosion of the gains they had reached in the 1970s. The Confederations were pushed in a defensive position. Additionally, the trade unions were challenged by structural changes in the economy. Declining employment in the agricultural and the manufacturing sector, where unionization was high meant that it became harder for them to position themselves as representatives of the Italian working class as a whole⁶ Another implication of the crisis of trade unions of the epoch was the growth of autonomous unions, especially in the public sector.

The 1990s were characterized by corruption scandals, the end of the Soviet Union and its implications for the Communist movement in Italy and the rise of a right-wing movement. The right-winged populist Silvio Berlusconi established the Forza Italia gained significance in this decade. Additionally the traditional left block with the Communist Party was consumed by an identity crisis after the dissolvent of the Soviet Union ⁷. On a political level the frequent change in government did not impede neoliberal policies to take place. Privatizations and liberalizations marked the economic policies of the decade. This political crisis brought about a rupture between the main three trade union confederations and the political parties they were affiliated to. Furthermore all trade unions

⁶ For further information on the composition of the Italian trade unions see (GIANGRANDE, 2016).

⁷ A right winged coalition under the leadership of Silvio Berlusconi took power in 1994 with a clear neoliberal agenda. His government only held for mere 8 months. Afterwards a technocratic government took on power led by Lamberto Dini. New elections eventually brought a center-left coalition to power leading to a shift in government every two years.

faced the challenge of their members being pensioners. In 1993, half of the membership of the CGIL was retired. This also meant that a planned reform of the pension system led to massive protests and a general strike organized by the trade unions. However, these mobilizations did not lead to an increase in membership for the trade unions. By the end of the 1990s, the total membership of the three confederations was only just over half of the employees of the country (HYMAN, 2001). On a political level the end of the 1990s saw yet another government led by Silvio Berlusconi. He then came back to power from 2001 until 2006. After losing one election he managed to lead the government yet again in 2008 (BBC, 2016). Another turning point for Italy's industrial relations was in 2009 when an agreement was signed that utterly reformed the collective bargaining system to allow sectorial agreements to be modified at a company level. The CGIL was the only confederation that did not sign the agreement. "The Berlusconi government had achieved its declared goal of dividing the unions, at least at the centre" (NAMUTH, 2013, 1).

3.3.4 Industrial relations in France

The French trade union movement as it exists today has its origins at the end of the Second World War, even though the main trade union CGT was founded in the mid 19th century. Similar to the Italian labor movement, French trade unionism belongs to the Southern European group which is marked by ideological divisions and labor regulation that is based on legislation. The French labor movement did not originate in the context of a large concentrated working class. The rural parts of France were integrated into the proletariat late, in the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore the working class has been marked by heterogeneity and by being sociologically mixed. This is one of the reasons why the trade union movement has never been completely united to represent the working class as a whole (PERNOT, 20210). The state plays an important role in mediating between the labor movement and employers' representatives. There are no extensive structures of negotiation. Therefore the history of the French working class is "an endless chronic of mobilizations against the employers" (PERNOT, 20210, 6).

After the liberation of France, the *Confédération du Travail* (CGT) dominated the trade union movement. The CGT traditionally had close links to the Communist Party of France. This link was especially strong in the years after the end of the war. The CGT officially called for the economic reconstruction of the country. However to prevent there being too much of an organic relationship with the French Communist Party the CGT prohibited the accumulation of parliamentary and trade union positions at the same time. The CGT promoted the idea of "revolutionary trade unionism" (FRÉMINVILLE, 2015). In line with its ideology the CGT also opposed the Marshall plan that was implemented by the USA. The trade union confederation practiced confrontational politics with strikes and street mobilizations being their way of asserting their demands. The strikes of 1947

brought an increase in salaries of 25% (FRÉMINVILLE, 2015).

The French labor movement experienced its first significant split after the strikes in 1947. The *Force Ouvrière* (FO) represented trade unionists that thought the CGT strategy was too confrontative. Financed by the CIA of the United States the FO was also a means to weaken communist influence within the French labor movement. The creation of the CFDT in 1964, was yet another important point in the history of the French trade union movement. Originally the CFDT came from the Christian labor movement and highlighted an approach that was more focused on negotiation. The CFDT has however been associated with the Socialist Party of France (FRÉMINVILLE, 2015).

In the 1970s the unionization rate was at 20 %. In the 1980s the trade union movement had already lost half of their members. A turning point of the French industrial relations came in 1981 when the French Socialists won the presidential elections. This was important since the victory of a Socialist Party came as Europe was experiencing an economic tide that was turning in favor of neoliberal conservatism. It came about through a broad coalition of the left with the Communist Party and other left-winged parties. “One of the many unforeseen consequences of the great 1981 victory of the French Left was that what, at the end of the Second World War, had been the strongest communist party in Western Europe, had, within the space of a few years, lost over half of its national electorate and seen the end of its ideological influence”(SASSOON, 2013, 542). The CGT supported the four Communist ministers that served in the government. However by the end of the 1980s the CGT had pulled back its close support and the railway strikes in 1987 once again demonstrated the trade unions’ ability to mobilize and to paralyze the country.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the CGT also entered a period of disorientation. The other two large trade unions, FO and CFDT, were able to profit off of this situation. However the 1990s mark a period where all trade unions started to intentionally distance themselves from political parties. The large mobilizations of 1995 again demonstrated a large capacity of mobilizations of the trade union movement. This time the FO and CGT mobilized together. The beginning of the 2000s saw large struggles against the pension reform that implied the trade unions (FRÉMINVILLE, 2015). The 2000s additionally saw significant splits from the CFDT into smaller more combative radical left unions such as the *Solidaires unitaires et démocratiques* (SUD) that have ever since been part of the trade union movement.

3.4 Trade Unions and Migration – a contradictory relationship?

This section analyses the relationship between trade unions and migrants. The first item will summarize the current literature on European trade unions and migrants. It will describe common dynamics that exist for European trade unions when dealing with immigration. The following sections will go into the four countries of interest to this thesis. An account of the main changes that have happened in the trade union strategies and positions towards immigrants will be discussed.

The last thirty years of neoliberal governance have led to an enormous concentration of wealth and, at the same time, workforces are facing increasingly precarious circumstances. The challenges trade unions of the Global North face are similar: Growing inequality, the growth of low-wage non-union workforces, the inability of unions to speak with a coherent voice on behalf of all workers and a growing demonization of foreigners, especially Muslims. Trade unions have an essential role to play in a successful mobilization against concentrated economic and political power. Immigrant workers occupy a central position in the low-wage workforce and therefore trade unions play a key role in the struggle for their rights. Precarious workforces include large numbers of vulnerable immigrant workers everywhere in the Global North. “The availability of low-wage immigrant labor has given employers a strengthened hand to push for freer labor markets and weaker unions, to play groups of workers off against each other, to fragment the collective cohesion and bargaining power of workers and their organizations of representation” (TURNER, 2014, 8). Furthermore, the challenges many trade unions of the Global North face are the difficulties to organize and advocate for immigrants are similar. Most trade unions have therefore recognized the changing workforce realities and have changed their official policies. Most unions have also given up their restrictive stance on immigration and have adopted policies that recognize immigrants above all as workers in need of representation and organization.

Low wage work⁸ has expanded in all of the Global North and immigrant workers are more likely to end up in low-wage work than native-born workers. Additionally precarious work has expanded (see 2.2.1) and immigrants are also more likely to be exposed to this kind of work. Similarly, inequality (measured in the GINI coefficient) has risen in the entire Global North.

At the same time union membership has decreased in most countries of the Global North. International competition has weakened unions in their manufacturing strongholds where jobs and production are mobile. “Thus the mirror image confronting unions in today’s world markets: if good jobs in manufacturing can flee the Global North, many of the

⁸ The official definition of low wage work by the OCED is a earning less than two thirds of the median earnings of employees in an economy.

remaining jobs can be populated by immigrant workers in precarious circumstances that allow employers to keep labor standards down“ (AVENDAÑO *et al.*, 2014, 19). Therefore trade unions should have enough incentive to organize migrants and to turn to them as part of the low-wage work force that they need to organize and support. The trade union’s stance towards immigration and migrants is important since they “are likely to affect the position of migrant workers within the labor market and within society“ (MARINO *et al.*, 2015, 1). However, trade union representation of migrants still remains relatively low. In all countries of the Global North the unionization rate of migrants is lower than that of native-workers. There are several explanations as to why this is the case.

Pennix and Roosblad (PENNINX; ROOSBLAD, 2002) have identified 3 main contradictions that trade unions of the Global North face on the issue of migration: The first one is resisting immigration versus cooperating, the second excluding immigrants as members versus including them and the third being providing equal versus special treatment. Most trade unions have solved the first two contradictions, not resisting immigration and acknowledging it as a fact. What remains is the third contradiction, which involves how to organize and support migrants in what way (AVENDAÑO *et al.*, 2014). A reason why the unionization of immigrants is low is also due to the labor market position migrants occupy. Unskilled, precarious and informal work relations are areas in which migrants are highly represented and these parts of the labor market have always been weak in terms of trade union activities.

From the migrant workers point of view it could be assumed that there are high incentives to join trade unions. Unions have three functions when it comes to organizing and representing labor migrants: representing the interests of immigrants as workers in order to improve their working conditions, providing immigrants with access to political participation and providing them with services that improve their living conditions. Therefore joining a union seems worthwhile for migrants themselves even though there are difficulties such as language and cultural differences (MARINO *et al.*, 2015).

However, some trade unions are more inclined than others to reach out towards migrant workers. There is significant research that suggests that trade unions whose membership power has declined significantly have opened up more towards migrants. Additionally, institutional entrenchment into government structures (as is the case for German trade unions) generally leads to a less inclusive attitude towards migrants. Institutional power seems to reduce the necessity of trade unions to reach out towards more marginalized groups. Another reason is that a single dominant union confederation that holds a monopoly position enjoys greater organizational security and therefore has fewer incentives to organize migrant workers. Competing union confederations are more willing to

recruit migrant workers as a means of gaining organizational strength at their rivals' expense (MARINO *et al.*, 2015)(GORODZEISKY; SEMYONOV, 2015).

“As neoliberal economic governance proves unsustainable, revitalized unions and their allies weigh in powerfully on the side of fundamental policy transformation in the drive for an inclusive, sustainable society” (AVENDAÑO *et al.*, 2014, 13). Given that union membership can be seen as a critical means for migrant workers to exercise an important range of social rights, migrants incorporation into trade unions is a strong indicator of their incorporation into the host countries societies (GORODZEISKY; SEMYONOV, 2015). Additionally it is important to keep in mind that decisions of trade unions to either exclude or represent migrants and how to represent and support migrants are on the one hand influenced by dynamics in society. Nevertheless, unions' decisions are not only influenced by external factors. Trade Unions do possess a degree of independence in their choices (MARINO; ROOSBLAD, 2008).

3.4.1 Trade union positions towards migrants in Sweden

As described in chapter 1 (see 2.1.1 and 2.2.3) the fordist migration regimes and for some part the neoliberal migration regime in Sweden was marked by strong union participation in migration policies. Trade unions *de facto* had control over immigration policies in Sweden. Since there has been a decline in union power and corporatism in Sweden, there were consequences for migration policies. Right-winged and liberal forces were able to push through their agenda more easily (BJÖRG; CERNA, 2015).

During the fordist migration regime and the beginning of the neoliberal migration regime, trade union confederations in Sweden had exceptional influence on migration policies. There was little room for other actors on the labor market to influence migration policies as well as ideological positions of political parties. The strong link between the Social Democratic Party (SAP), the trade union confederation LO and the Swedish National Labor Market Board (AMS) added institutional strength to the trade unions. In general the main trade union LO was supported by the other confederations, TCO and SACO, in positions towards immigration policies. “For a long time, Swedish unions enjoyed *de facto* veto power over labour immigration” (BJÖRG; CERNA, 2015). The LO had managed to pose heavy conditions on the recruitment of foreign workers. It was clear that immigrant workers should have the same standards as Swedes in terms of housing, education and social benefits. To execute this, the LO was able to deny work permits to immigrants. If employers failed to meet union standards on pay or working conditions the trade union confederation LO would deny them work permits for the immigrant workers they desired. Hereby the LO ensured that immigrant workers had equal working and wage conditions as native workers. This functioned as a guarantee that wages would not be undercut. These

strict standards were pushed through and secured by the “iron triangle” of the LO, the Social Democratic Party SAP and the Labor Market Board AMS.

The immigration laws that started to restrict labor immigration were contested by the employers’ association of the private sector, SAF, but they were not able to push through their interests against the “iron triangle” of the LO, SAP and AMS. For this reason labor migration constituted the smallest percentage of all migration types in the 1970s (see 2.1.1). In 1985 Swedish trade union density reached its peak with an organization rate of 85 %. During the beginning of the neoliberal migration regime, trade unions were able to form strong alliances around labor immigration, with blue-collar and white-collar unions and political parties and government agencies. The trade unions were therefore able to influence the conditions under which labor immigration took place. However, in the 2000s the trade unions had their influence over particularly the issue of labor migration diminished considerably.

Given the decline in trade union density, the alliances created around labor immigration became weaker and lost its force in the 2000s. Even though trade union density is still high when compared to other European countries and when compared to the other countries of interest to this thesis, for the Swedish context the LO’s unionization rate has gone down considerably. In 2008 union density rate (for all three union confederations) was 77%, compared to 85% in 1994. Among the three trade union confederations in Sweden, LO was particularly hard hit by the loss in members. The alliance between the three trade union confederations also diminished. The two confederations TCO and SACO took up more liberal positions towards labor migration and therefore undermined the strict stance of the LO-Sweden. An important turning point of labor immigration in Sweden was the enlargement of the European Union in 2004. Sweden was one of the countries that allowed citizens of the new member states access to its labor market. This was pushed through against the will of the LO and of the SAP. The Social Democrats did not receive a majority in the parliament to restrict access to the labor market for the new member states.

In chapter 1 (see 2.2.3) I argue that the context of the new migration law that was passed in 2008 presented yet another marking point. This law represents a form of managed migration in Sweden: It was introduced by the center right government with support from the Greens, and was primarily aimed at expanding labor immigration. It identified employers as being best suited to understand their own recruitment needs and it transferred the authority for processing cases involving resident and work permits from the Swedish public labor market authorities to the Swedish Migration Board. This additionally represented the undermining of trade unions’ influence on labor migration issues.

Labor migration had been kept to a minimum before and was under close supervision of the trade unions. This new law, that reflects the interests of employers, is clearly a consequence of a shift in power relations in Swedish society. “Since the new law has entered into force, some claim that the unions’ role is reduced to that of toothless consultation. More specifically, unions could be asked for their advice and approval in some cases of influence, but not in every work permit case”(BJÖRG; CERNA, 2015).

The new law was introduced in the midst of a global economic crisis. Trade unions have built alliances with employers in accepting labor migration and have tried to set salary levels and working conditions, given that the flows of immigrants could not be stopped with restrictive policies. The Swedish trade union confederations, especially the LO Sweden, has realized that changing the immigration laws in a liberal manner will help unions’ efforts to organize immigrants and to diminish their precarious economic and legal situation. Restrictive immigration policies lead to a more precarious situation of migrants themselves (BJÖRG; CERNA, 2015).

The Swedish trade unions have taken clear stances towards the refugee crisis. An example of this is a petition signed with the Council of the Nordic Trade Unions⁹ that call for the establishment of asylum seekers in the Nordic labor markets with faire conditions. They argue for the shortening of the validation process for education and to encourage language training for asylum seekers. The petition calls on the social partner to find solutions for entrance of refugees into the labor market (??). The LO Sweden’s positions towards refugees similarly focus strongly on their labor market integration. Therefore their contact with asylum seekers that are not part of the labor market is very limited. The LO has opened an office for undocumented migrants that seeks to give advice on labor rights. A LO official said: “We do not organize them because they are refugees, we organize them because they are workers” (KARRAS; MORINA, 2016, 32). Even though the asylum seekers and refugees have a relatively easy access to the Swedish labor market, when compared to other European countries, they still face many obstacles when trying to find a job. Given that it is not possible to even join the LO Sweden as an unemployed person, the possibilities for the LO to reach the group of refugees is more limited since their unemployment rate is higher than for everyone else. In public statements the LO Sweden has however made an effort to accentuate refugee rights (KARRAS; MORINA, 2016). Similar to the German discussion, the Swedish employers’ organization has suggested lowering the minimum wage for refugees and asylum seekers in order to facilitate their entry into the labor market. The LO Sweden is strictly against this and proposes more language classes and effective access to labor market services for refugees and asy-

⁹ The Council of the Nordic Trade Unions is a regional trade union confederation. Its members are 16 national trade union confederations from Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands.

lum seekers (FRIC; AUMAYR-PINTAR, 2016).

The Swedish trade union LO was historically marked by having strong influence over migration policies, especially concerning the labor market. Together with the “iron triangle” the LO was able to control labor migration into the country and to control the conditions under which immigrants were employed. With decreasing union density, the LO also lost some of its control over migration policies in Sweden. While the LO’s position towards immigration was to opt for a highly restrictive labor migration, the LO’s position changed in the 2000s also due to the differing power relations on the country. The LO shifted their position away from trying to restrict labor migration towards a position that is in favor of immigration but under certain circumstances. Currently the LO is still discussing how to reach out towards refugees and asylum seekers. By opening up an office for undocumented workers the LO Sweden is clearly recognizing that this group of immigrant workers is an important group that needs to be focused on.

3.4.2 Trade union positions towards migrants in Germany

The German case is marked by the power, influence and organizational status trade unions achieved in rebuilding the country of Western Germany. As I argued (see 3.3.2), trade unions were seen as forces for social integration and with the duty to avoid the cleavages that were destructive during the Weimar Republic. In the immediate post-war period trade unions were willing to integrate a growing number of immigrants at the workplace. Given that migrant workers were mostly based in the industrial heartland, this was also a part of the economy where trade unions were powerful. Trade unions therefore aided in the integration of migrants into the workplace. However, it must be noted that migrants, mostly unskilled, were recruited to do the worst paid jobs. “Most migrants, independent of their skill level, were contracted to do the low-paying, hardest, and dirtiest jobs; however, German unions ensured that these workers were covered by their collective agreements and were paid according to the same contractual standards as German workers” (AVENDAÑO *et al.*, 2014, 87).

During the guest worker migration regime in Germany the predominant idea was that the recruited workers would leave as soon as their employers were not in need of them anymore. The highly organized recruitment programs were regulated by bilateral agreements between Germany and the sending countries (see 2.1.2). The German trade union’s stance towards migration in this period was marked by the dominant migration regime of the time. They subscribed to the economic benefits resulting from organized migration. However, on the shop floor tensions persisted between trade union members and officials and migration workers. The governing mechanisms of works councils and codetermination were not fit to represent migrant workers. Language barriers and specific concerns of

migrant workers had to be addressed by trade unions. The reform of the Works Constitution Act, which was revised in the mid 1960s permitted non-Germans to run for positions in the Works Council. This gave new impetus to trade union involvement with migrant workers (AVENDAÑO *et al.*, 2014).

The guest worker recruitment programs officially stopped in 1973, however migration to Germany continued through a different legal channel. During the first phase of the neoliberal migration regime in Germany, family reunification was the main means of entrance for many migrants (see 2.2.4). Additionally there was a rise in xenophobia within the German society. Trade Unions in Germany officially harshly condemned the racist attacks of the 1980s and 1990s but the trade union confederation DGB also gave contradictory messages. The DGB was in favor of characterizing migrations as a reserve labor that should come second to German workers. German workers should have the right to a job before a migrant worker is considered for the job. When it came to positioning themselves to concrete legislative measures the DGB opposed the limitation of family reunion rights and opposed the expansion of causes for expulsion (AVENDAÑO *et al.*, 2014).

The 1990s and 2000s saw, on the one hand a substantial shift in the migration policies and patterns and a shift in the labor market. As argued (see 2.2.4) managed migration became a dominant form of migration paired with asylum migration. However asylum migration was paired with negative attributes and was increasingly restricted. Additionally unemployment had risen to 9 % in 1983. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 a rapid deindustrialization of Eastern Germany took place resulting in a further surge in unemployment (16% in 1992). The labor market became polarized between the core workforce and a periphery of lower skilled workers, posing a challenge to trade unions (see 2.2.4). The rise in these types of atypical work, in which migrants were typically employed, cemented the pay gap between migrant workers and German workers. Even though union contracts ensured equal pay, these segments of the labor market were not incorporated in trade union agreements. Germany did not have a minimum wage and therefore the segments of the economy where trade union representation was weak or non-existent did not profit from collective agreements. The low-wage workforce increased from the mid-1990s up to 20.8 % in 2004, one of the highest across continental Europe. The so-called mini-jobs, a new form of precarious, atypical employment were considered one of the main drivers for the expansion of low wage work (AVENDAÑO *et al.*, 2014, 18).

With the enlargement of the European Union in 2004, the DGB supported the seven year ban on the freedom of movement of persons from these countries. In reality the seven year ban did not lessen the presence of foreign workers from Eastern European countries in Germany, it just mainly caused a further division of working conditions and pay between

migrant workers and German workers. Additionally the rise in xenophobia and racism has also been a problem for trade unions internally. A high-level Commission on far right extremism within the DGB was launched in 2000 and found that the attitudes of trade union members mirror those of society as a whole. Alarming the report found “no evidence of the existence of a trade union belief system in the membership” (AVENDAÑO *et al.*, 2014, 95). Due to this there have been several campaigns by trade union federations, such as the metal union IG Metall campaign *Respekt!*, countering racism. There have, however, also been more concrete steps taken towards migrant workers from trade unions. One of these has been the united campaign of all sectorial trade unions for a minimum wage. The minimum wage, which was recently introduced (in 2015), will foremost help workers in atypical employment conditions and therefore many migrant workers. There have additionally been several examples where trade unions have concretely struggled for the rights of migrant workers. One example is the services union Verdi that helped an illegalized au pair in Hamburg fight for wages that had not been paid (AVENDAÑO *et al.*, 2014). However, Ver.di also refused membership to a group of refugees in 2013 and the DGB Brandenburg-Berlin called the police to evict a group of refugees from their premise that were demanding trade union membership (BERGFELD, 2017).

All in all the German trade union’s approaches towards immigrants has been contradictory. This is equally reflected in their approach towards the current refugees. As discussed in chapter 1 (see 2.3.5), German society initially reacted towards the refugees arriving in Germany with a *Willkommenskultur*, meaning a civil society movement welcoming the arriving immigrants. An estimated 10.9 % of the population has been involved in voluntary work with refugees. I also described the downside of this movement with the far right party, AfD, gaining strength with a xenophobic rhetoric. Over 1000 asylum seekers homes have been attacked. Within this societal context, the DGB and several sectorial trade unions in Germany have led anti racist campaigns geared primarily towards their members.

Additionally, the trade unions in Germany have strongly focused on the labor market integration of refugees. These positions “reduce refugees...to their labour power” (BERGFELD, 2017, 82). The trade unions accept the government’s migration and asylum policies and propose improvements within the given framework. The unions do not criticize Germany’s exclusionary migration and asylum policy for people of certain countries, such as Afghanistan¹⁰. This “is a product of the trade unions’ traditions role and persistent self-image as a social partner in a tripartite corporatist system” (BERGFELD, 2017, 83). This “refugee corporatism” implicates that the focus of trade union demands

¹⁰ Bergfeld calls this „logic of optimisation“ (BERGFELD, 2017, 86).

that concern immigrants are about their integration into the labor market ¹¹ . Trade unions struggle against a further segmentation of the labor market and are therefore keen on shaping labor market policies that affect refugees. At the same time several sectorial trade unions, such as the IG Metall, have opened an information and advice bureau, which services to asylum seekers and migrants in questions regarding housing and employment.

It is clear that trade union attitudes towards immigrants has changed in the since 2000. However, the actions of the German trade unions rest confined within the limits given by the government. This has to do with the role that was attributed to trade unions by the end of the Second World War. While the DGB as well as sectorial unions have opened up service centers that cater to the needs of refugees and immigrants, there has not been a nation-wide campaign advocating for their rights.

3.4.3 Trade union positions towards migrants in Italy

The Italian trade union movement has been marked by struggles for the legalization of illegalized migrants. The labor movement has acknowledged that restrictive immigration policies do not impede migrants from coming to Italy but merely further increase the informal economy. It was argued in the first chapter of this thesis that unions within an industrial relations system categorized as “antagonistic such as the Mediterranean one” tend to have more inclusive policies towards migrants and put more effort into organizing, recruiting and integrating immigrant workers. Traditional communist unions have typically excluded the notion of organizing immigrants through specific and separate bodies. The Italian labor movement and especially the Italian trade unions however have displayed an “unusual inclusive attitude...towards early immigrants” (MARINO; ROOSBLAD, 2008, 630). Immigrants were never conceived as a threat to native workers.

As discussed earlier, migration in Italy has always been closely linked to domestic work. Migrants from the South of the country to the North worked as domestic workers and the first waves of foreign workers that came to Italy were mostly women from the former colonies that were also employed as domestic workers (see 2.2.5). Given that illegalized immigration to Italy plays a large role in the immigration patterns and also in the trade union strategies towards migration, it is worth describing this dynamic as it presents itself today. A significant number of irregular migrants are employed as domestic workers, taking care of children, the elderly and performing other domestic services. This system of care services is largely performed by women and has led to the “growth of an informal welfare system in which waged immigrant women enter Italian families, [...], to help them carry out the many tasks socially assigned to women” (AMBROSINI, 2013, 361). Families

¹¹ There is widespread knowledge about the fact that Germany is experiencing a labor shortage and is therefore in need of labor force (BERGFELD, 2017)

as employers are therefore one of the main sources of attraction for labor migration into Italy. Irregular migrants are willing to undertake the hard work with the advantage of having board and lodging and will accept wages that are affordable for Italian middle and working class families. “An irregular migrant costs less, is more flexible and makes fewer demands” (AMBROSINI, 2013, 363). There is an unwritten rule “of generalized tolerance” for illegalized domestic workers, meaning that they are rarely deported and have a relatively good chance of being regularized after some time.

The CGIL, the trade union confederation that is of interest to this thesis, has a relatively weak ability to influence other social partners. As explained earlier on in this chapter (see 3.3.3) CGIL is not integrated into government structures the same way the Swedish and German trade unions are. This means that CGIL has more difficulty obtaining improvements to immigration laws and the employment conditions of immigration workers (MARINO; ROOSBLAD, 2008). However, immigrant’s problems and specific challenges are always present.

As discussed (see 2.2.5), Italy is a relatively new immigration country. Foreign immigration to Italy started in the early 1970s and was always characterized by illegalized migration. The employment of undocumented migrants is concentrated in certain sectors such as domestic labor, care work, construction and agriculture. The foreign workers’ participation rate in the labor market is relatively high (at 73,7%) while that of natives is 57,9%. The unemployment rate of foreigners in Italy is at 8,6% while that of natives is at 6,7% (2007). This means that immigration to Italy is strongly linked to job seeking (MARINO; ROOSBLAD, 2008).

The CGIL has been critical of restrictive immigration laws, such as the *Bossi - Fini Law*, that links a residence permit to a labor contract (see 2.2.5). As explained earlier, one of CGIL’s main concerns is the increase in illegalized migration that they see as being promoted by restrictive immigration policies such as the *Bossi-Fini Law*. The CGIL, together with the other trade union confederations CISL and UIL, participated in initiatives and demonstrations, acting as a pressure group towards the government and local administrations in several cases.

In Italy trade unions have set up assistance in forms of front offices that give advice and consultation on the regularizations of residence and work and gaining access to housing and public services. However, the CGIL does not actively recruit or organize immigrants (MARINO; ROOSBLAD, 2008). The CGIL in particular has created a specific office to deal with immigrant issues, the *Uffici immigrati*, that provides services without asking for

a union card ¹². This is the connecting channel between the CGIL and immigrant workers. When the CGIL does recruit migrant workers, it is mostly through this structure. Another reason for this is that immigrant workers are often employed in sectors with scarce union presence and are rarely in contact with the sectorial unions on a shop floor level.

There are however exceptions. The metal workers union branch of the CGIL, the FIOM-CGIL, has the structure of the *coordinamento migranti*, set up originally by migrant workers in the metal sector. The *coordinamento migranti* serves as coordination for trade unionists to promote initiatives, internal union debate and to influence policy making of the CGIL itself. This structure does not have any formal role in the decision-making process within the trade union but it serves as an important reference point when it comes to migrant issues. Similarly the Agricultural Federation of the CGIL, the FLAI, has various experiences organizing immigrants that work in the agricultural sector. (MARINO; ROOSBLAD, 2008).

In general it can be said that Italian trade unions are able to enter into contact with migrant workers and integrate their interests with those of natives. Italy has a high unionization rate among immigrant workers and foreign trade unionists are elected at workplaces and in the higher positions within the union. The CGIL has put a stronger focus on building up relations with migrant workers as potential members. In this sense the CGIL provides migrants with “secondary political participation” (MARINO; ROOSBLAD, 2008).

The Italian trade union movement, especially the CGIL has been actively involved in facilitating the labor market access for refugees. They are providing information for newly arriving migrants, particularly through offices that are dedicated to topics relating to immigration. Decent working condition for migrants is one of the main issues concerning the CGIL especially due to segmented labor market. The CGIL is especially engaged in providing information and assistance to refugees, asylum seekers and other migrants. They also advocate for safe routes for migrants and they are opposed to the EU - Turkey deal (see 2.3.3.3) and are in favor of an internal EU resettlement plan. Additionally the CGIL has been actively supporting movements that struggle for migrants and refugee’s rights (CGIL, 2017).

Italy’s trade union CGIL has been focusing on illegalized immigrants for the last two decades. They have been advocating for more possibilities to enter into a legal status due to large informal sector that exists in the country and that trade unions in general have

¹² However it is important to note that the *Uffici immigrati* is not the only means of contact the CGIL has with immigrants. Particularly the Federations of the CGIL have organized immigrants.

little access to. The positions and actions of the CGIL have included actively participating in immigrant rights movements and setting up supportive front offices. The last decade are marked by an even stronger involvement in migrants struggles, also due to the increased visibility of immigrant movements.

3.4.4 Trade union positions towards migrants in France

The French trade union's approaches and strategies towards migrants are marked by the trade union landscape with competing national confederations. This has at times played to the interests of immigrant workers, as unions compete for membership and influence. At the same time, organizational rivalries have often stood in the way of cohesive strategies and comprehensive campaigns to organize and integrate immigrants. The demands and struggles of immigrants and trade unions have always targeted the state as well as employers.

For most of the fordist migration regime and during the time of foreign labor recruitment, trade union policies were largely protectionist. Trade unions positions and approaches towards immigrant workers changed after the strikes of 1968, where migrant workers played a key role. In 1974 the two largest trade union confederations CFDT and CGT issued a joint declaration of solidarity with immigrant workers. Another turning point was the major strikes in 1975 and 1983 in the automobile industry. Both strikes were led by migrant workers and supported by the CGT and CFDT.

In the 1980s immigrant struggles shifted their focus towards society. Civil society organizations were founded such as the organization SOS racism that then started leading the struggles and movements for immigrant rights and against racism. Schools, churches and communities became important places of struggle and organizing. Trade unions ceased to play a leading role in these movements given that they were not based in the workplace, even though trade unionists were active in them (TURNER, 2014).

A central component of inequality within French society is the expansion of a low-wage immigrant workforce, often in an irregular situation. However within a European context, France has a rather low incidence of low-wage workers (12%) and the share actually declined from the 1990s to 2007. One of the main reasons for this is France's high minimum wage that has been indexed to inflation as well as to the growth of overall productivity. This trend has been, however, reversed by in the Sarkozy era (2007 -2012) and the economic crisis that started in 2008. France's labor market is deeply segmented, with foreign-born workers more likely to be part of the precarious workforce than native workers.

As argued (see 2.2.6), one of the features of the neoliberal migration regime are undocumented migrants. While it used to be a phase many migrants accepted before entering a legalized situation, the neoliberal migration regimes offered less and less possibilities for the regularization of *sans papiers*. The trade union strategy towards and with migrants had lost momentum in the 1980s as immigrant rights movements shifted towards a broader social focus. This changed again in the mid 2000s. The CGT engaged in efforts to address low wages and poor working conditions and to demand regularizations. The main breakthrough and shift in the CGT approach came when the trade union confederation engaged in a cross-sectorial strike led by illegalized immigrants. The demands did not only include wages and working conditions but also insisted that employers support the work permit applications of individual workers. This strike movement also opened up union membership for current or former undocumented workers. The main action was concentrated in the capital, Paris. In France the trade union CGT has been the most active in the recent migrant movements¹³. Separate union structures for immigrants do not exist in the French trade unions. “As unions respond to the demands of immigrant workers in precarious workforces, we find a recurrent tension between the need to provide services to individuals and efforts to mobilize workers in collective action” (TURNER, 2014, 79).

The two strikes that were organized mainly by the CGT, therefore mark a main shift in trade union attitudes towards immigrants. The first strike movement in 2008, L’act I, brought immigrant workers into the center of organizing efforts. The campaign was mostly concentrated in the restaurant sector and led to about 2000 regularizations and an equal number of new union members for the CGT. The strikes in 2009- 2010, l’act II, in which the CGT joined a coalition of trade unions and NGOs “was a breakthrough that garnered broad labor and social support, including both workplace-based and civil society organizations” (TURNER, 2014, 81). This movement brought the trade unions into new arenas of the precarious workforce, including domestic services and temporary work. This time about 6000 undocumented workers went on a public strike, occupying their workplace. The outcome of this strike was less of a clear victory. Even though many improvements were fought through, all those on strike were not automatically regularized. Both strikes meant that thousands of undocumented workers emerged from the shadows into the public arena (BARRON *et al.*, 2011).

The strikes took place while the conservative president Sarkozy, who especially targeted the Muslim population in France, was in office fostering anti-immigrant sentiment. The ban on burkas that went into effect in 2011, was an example of how the government

¹³ The CFDT has been more hesitant and the FO has openly criticized the CGT’s approach and concentrated on more individual struggles of illegalized workers. In all three trade unions immigrant workers have risen to positions of union leadership.

advanced anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes¹⁴. In light of this political context however, due to the strikes, the CGT together with a coalition of other trade unions and civil society organizations¹⁵, became the main negotiating partner for the government when it came to immigration policies.

The far right party *Front National* (FN) approached near 20 % in the 2012 elections. In the 2017 elections their candidate, Le Pen, managed to get into the final round. Anti-immigration rhetoric has been part of her campaign. The trade unions have been at the forefront of anti racist campaigns by insisting on the inclusive integration of immigrant workers as French workers and citizens (or future citizens). This can be felt until today. During the last presidential elections the CGT campaigned heavily against the anti immigration rhetoric of the FN candidate. In leaflets that the CGT published (CGT, 2017) they accentuate the fact the immigrants are an essential part of the workforce. They even argue that immigrants have a positive effect on the labor market and are in no way responsible for unemployment. Concerning refugees, the CGT has underlined its solidarity with victims of the war and has refused the distinction between “real refugees” and those that are considered not to be (CGT, 2017). The shift in the CGT approach to immigrants was marked by the strikes. The trade union began playing a leading role as organizers of immigrant social movements. Additionally the CGT engaged in a coalition with civil society organizations demanding the regularization of illegalized immigrants. In the anti-racist campaigns that CGT has continued to accentuate that immigrants are part of the workforce. This is a shift that can be traced by to the strikes of 2008.

3.5 Conclusion of Chapter 3

This chapter has given an overview of the labor movements in Western Europe, particularly in Italy, Germany, France and Sweden. It was showed that the different organization of industrial relations in the four countries has had consequences for the trade union traditions and modes of action.

In the first section of this chapter, as a conceptual landmark, it was briefly described the main thoughts of Keynes on unemployment. Keynes argues against neoclassical theories and states that the market does not regulate itself alone. Government intervention is needed. Unemployment, understood by the author as a moral problem, results of the normal function of capitalist economies, as money plays an important role. The trade unions in Western Europe have developed different approaches to trying to influence the

¹⁴ Roughly 2000 women in France wore a Burka at the time the law entered into force and still continue to do so (TURNER, 2014, 73).

¹⁵ This coalition, that was formed for the strike movement l’act II, was called *collectif des onze* since it was a coalition of eleven different organizations

government and the labor market and in trying to keep unemployment at a minimum. I have re-narrated the studies that have been conducted concerning the supposed impact of migration to the labor market. The main finding is that migration is not a game changer on the labor market. Similar conclusions have been made by studies that consider the current migration dynamics in Europe and the labor market. International Organizations, especially, have promoted the outcome that the current “migration crisis” in Europe will in itself not have a negative impact on wages or the labor market in general.

The Southern industrial relations have a history of ideologically divided labor movements. Labor regulations are depended more on legislation and less on collective bargaining and management from trade union sides. The industrial relations are highly politicized. For the Italy this meant that the CGIL, even though it is the largest and most influential trade union confederation, still is exposed to competition from other trade union confederations. The CGIL was closely associated to the Communist Party and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, paired with corruption scandals, therefore also had dire consequences for the trade union. The CGIL’s positions and action towards immigrants have also been highly politicized. It has opened up front offices for immigrants and has opened up internal structures that are responsible for specific concerns of migrants. Additionally, the CGIL is active in immigrant rights movements. The last decade has seen a strong focus of the CGIL on these movements. The French labor movement is also classified as being part of the group of Southern industrial relations. Similar to the CGIL in Italy, the CGT is the largest and most influential trade union in France and has historically been close to the Communist Party. After the Communist Party participated in a governing coalition in the 1980s, the CGT entered a crisis in which it started distancing itself stronger from the Communist Party. The CGT’s involvement in immigrant struggles and migrants rights has historically been strongly workplace oriented. A major shift happened when the CGT organized strikes of illegalized immigrants, making the topic of migration a stronger focus within the organization. The industrial relations of the central European group are marked by long established traditions of social partnership and tripartite institutions. Trade unions are incorporated in policy making and administration. In Germany the DGB, the German Confederation of Trade Unions, has been marked by unity. The welfare state of Western Germany enabled the DGB to participate in the management of the labor market. The fragmentation of the labor market and the decline in union membership in the 1980s and 1990s mean a decline in the DGBs strength in society. The DGB has had a contradictory relationship towards immigrants. At times the DGB has opted in favor or restricting migration, such as was the case after the EU enlargement. However there have also been cases of where the trade unions (more on a sectorial basis with Ver.di and IG Metall) have reached out towards migrants and have actively participated in the struggle for their rights. This has certainly marked a shift in their approach. The

Nordic industrial relations are based on an institutionalized class compromises and high levels of unionization. The voluntary unemployment systems are managed by the unions themselves. The Swedish trade union LO therefore directly participates in the regulation of the labor market. This same dynamic can be found in the trade union approaches towards migration. The LO Sweden was managed labor migration into Sweden for several decades. The LO Sweden's role and positions started to change when their trade union membership decreased and with it their power in society. This inclined the LO Sweden to leave their position on trying to keep labor migration to a minimum behind. Instead the LO Sweden is trying to negotiate the terms under which migration is allowed to happen.

4 Conclusion

The research question of this thesis is if the positions of trade unions in Europe towards immigrants have changed since the 2000s. I have chosen a comparative perspective of four countries: Italy, Germany, France and Sweden. Given that these four countries are part of Western Europe there are similarities between them. A more profound analysis however makes it clear that there are also significant differences between the four countries. This has had effects on the trade union's attitudes and actions towards immigrants. A historical analysis of the migration regimes, the industrial relations and the trade unions positions towards migrants have allowed me to scrutinize the changes that have taken place in the trade union's positions towards immigrants. It is clear that trade unions in all four countries have changed their position towards migrants in the last fifteen years. They have all taken steps towards immigrants. However, there are considerable differences between the trade unions in how much of a change has taken place and to what extent they consider immigration and issues of immigrants as important topics. While discussing the trade unions of Italy, Germany, France and Sweden I chose to concentrate in the CGIL in Italy, on the CGT in France, on the DGB in Germany and on the LO in Sweden.

The fordist migration regimes in Western Europe were marked by the official recruitment of immigrant workers. This was essential for the economic development after 1945. In Sweden the industrial relations after the end of the Second World War were characterized by collective bargaining systems and by a high union density. Given the close relationship between the trade union LO and the Social Democratic Party, the LO had significant influence on policy making. The LO had extensive autonomy for governing the labor market and determining the working conditions of the country. During the guest worker regime, the Swedish government recruited foreign workers, mainly from Finland. The trade union LO played an important role in the organization of labor recruitment into Sweden, which prevented the undercutting of social standards. The LO put heavy conditions on the recruitment of foreign workers and was even able to deny work permits to companies that wanted to employ foreign workers but did not live up to the social standards imposed by the LO. In Germany the guest worker programs were also highly organized with the German Republic signing agreements with several countries in order to facilitate labor migration. The main idea was that the guest workers would leave if their employer did not need them anymore. The industrial relations in Germany were built upon the compromise that trade unions should serve as forces for social integration. There was a Keynesian compromise in which full employment was the goal of govern-

ment policy that the trade unions signed up to. The trade unions were therefore in favor of the labor recruitment programs and there were attempts to organize foreign workers within the union. However, it was forbidden for non-Germans to run for positions in the Works Council in the 1960s limiting the participation of foreign workers in trade union structures. In Italy the fordist migration regime was characterized by emigration from the country and by internal migration from the south to the north. The trade union movement started off united but then very rapidly disintegrated. The CGIL was the largest and most influential trade union in Italy. A series of company agreements regulated the industrial relations, together with state laws. The French migration regime during fordism was marked by the recruitment of foreign workers and by (post) colonial ties. Illegalized migration was part of the French migration regime from the very start. The trade union landscape is marked by competing national confederations. The struggles of the labor movement target the government and the state as well as employers. The CGTs positions towards immigrants during this period were mainly protectionist. The struggles and movements of 1968 meant a radical change in the CGTs positions towards immigrants and immigration.

After the end of the official recruitment of foreign workers in the beginning of the 1970s in Western Europe, most immigration took place through family reunification and through asylum. Illegalized immigration became a relevant part of immigration. The neoliberal period meant a rhetoric and policy of “zero immigration” and for the trade unions this period was mostly marked by a decline in membership and shift in the power relations of society in favor of employers. In Sweden there was a rise in unemployment and a decline in trade union power. The LO Sweden was still able to hold on to restrictive immigration policies. However it was only in the 2000s that trade unions considerably lost influence. By contrast, in Germany, the 1980s mark a sharp decline in the power and union membership of the DGB. A considerable number of workers were pushed to the margins of the work force, which additionally reduced the regulatory effect of the industrial relations. The rise in racism and hate crimes in the 1980s and 1990s led the DGB and its affiliates to foster anti-racism campaigns. For Italy an important aspect of the neoliberal period was the shift from being an emigration country to an immigration country. Additionally the CGIL was marked by corruption scandals and by a phase of reorientation after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The CGIL called for more legal ways to immigrate to Italy very early on in an attempt to struggle against illegalized immigration and the employment forms that are linked to this type of immigration. The CGIL was active in immigrant rights movements and in movements calling for the legalization of those with residence and work permits. The CGT in France also saw its power and membership decline. After the participation of the Communist Party in a coalition government the CGT reoriented itself. Given that the main struggles of immigrants were focused on civil

society during this period, the trade unions were marginalized within migrant movements.

A shift within the neoliberal migration regime, which took place in the four countries at different points in the 2000s, also brought about a shift in the trade union's approaches and positions towards immigrants. There was a selective opening towards labor migrants that I referred to as managed migration. The current surge of refugees that entered the European Union has further shaped the migration regimes of the four countries I focused on in this thesis. In Sweden a new law was passed in 2008, expanding labor migration. This law was pushed through against the will of the LO Sweden since it considerably reduced its role in governing the immigration into the country. However, this law has also produced a shift in the trade union's position and approach towards migration. After intense internal discussion the LO has abandoned its restrictive stance and has accepted migration under certain circumstances. Currently the LO Sweden is advocating for the labor market integration of the asylum seekers and refugees that are already in Sweden. The opening up of an office for undocumented migrants surely indicates that the LO Sweden is taking steps towards immigrants. The LO Sweden is facing offensives by the employers that have suggested suspending the minimum wage for refugees. In Germany managed migration was implemented through a law that entered into force in 2005. The DGB has had a contradictory position towards immigration. While the DGB supported a ban on the freedom of movement for the new member states of the European Union in 2004, there have been examples of trade union organized and supported struggles with immigrants. In the current situation the DGB proposes improvements for the labor market integration of refugees. Similar to Sweden, the DGB is also faced by an offensive of the employers calling for the suspension of the minimum wage for refugees. In Italy the Bossi Fini law introduced a form of managed migration to the country. The CGIL has a tradition of struggling together with immigrants. The CGIL has front offices that give advice for issues concerning the regularization of work and residence permits. Similar to France, an issue the trade union movement is facing is the large number of illegalized workers. Some sectorial unions have even created structures within their unions for migrants. Currently the CGIL actively supports refugees and asylum seekers by handing out information and providing assistance. In France the Loi Hortefeux opened up more possibilities for labor migration. This law enabled French employers to start a legalization process for their employees in an irregular situation. The CGT organized two strike movements aimed at employers and the state to legalize a large group of workers without residence or work permits. This active organization of (illegalized) migrants marks a significant shift in the CGTs attitude towards immigrants. A similarity of the trade unions in all four countries is the engagement in anti-racist campaigns and movements. Given that the far right is an active political force in all countries, the LO-Sweden, the DGB, the CGIL and the CGT have made a point to struggle against racism, even in their own ranks.

The trade unions attitudes and positions towards migrants in Sweden, Germany, France and Italy have changed since the 2000s. All the trade unions analyzed in this thesis have opened up and adopted a positive attitude towards migrants. However the extent to which this positive shift has happened differs greatly. This shift can be seen in the trade union positions towards migrants in Germany and Sweden, which both abandoned their positions of sealing off the labor market from immigrant workers. Both the LO Sweden and the DGB have made attempts towards migrants by opening up front offices for illegalized immigrants and by engaging in punctual struggles. However there has not been a nation-wide campaign for immigrant rights. In Italy and France the trade unions CGIL and CGT are pro active when it comes to engaging in immigrant struggles. The CGIL has a long history of being present in immigrant struggles and representing immigrants. The CGT has organized a strike of illegalized immigrants, calling for their regularization. Both provide assistance to refugees, asylum seekers, illegalized immigrants and other migrants.

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