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Type: Artigo de periódico
Title: An Alternative Approach For Quasi-truth
Author: Coniglio M.E.
Silvestrini L.H.C.
Abstract: In 1986, Mikenberg et al. introduced the semantic notion of quasi-truth defined by means of partial structures. In such structures, the predicates are seen as triples of pairwise disjoint sets: the set of tuples which satisfies, does not satisfy and can satisfy or not the predicate, respectively. The syntactical counterpart of the logic of partial truth is a rather complicated first-order modal logic. In the present article, the notion of predicates as triples is recursively extended, in a natural way, to any complex formula of the first-order object language. From this, a new definition of quasi-truth is obtained. The proof-theoretic counterpart of the new semantics is a first-order paraconsistent logic whose propositional base is a 3-valued logic belonging to hierarchy of paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency, which was proposed by Carnielli and Marcos in 2002. © The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press.All rights reserved.
Editor: Oxford University Press
Rights: fechado
Identifier DOI: 10.1093/jigpal/jzt026
Date Issue: 2014
Appears in Collections:Unicamp - Artigos e Outros Documentos

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