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|Type:||Artigo de periódico|
|Title:||Institutions and politics in horizontal accountability|
|Abstract:||The article presents an analysis of the parliamentary committees investigations formed in the lower house from 1946 to 1999. It examines the incidence of this type of oversight action under different political regimes and the use of other kinds of oversight activities in the period after the 1988 constitution. The article aims to show how institutional and political variables interact in accounting for congressional activation of existing oversight mechanisms and to discuss the conditions under which these actions may succeed. The author argues that the control of the agenda and the legislative process by the president and party leaders affects negatively congress members' incentives and their chances of success in oversight activities. The empirical focus is Brazil, but the conclusions can be more generally applied to countries with similar institutional design.|
|Appears in Collections:||Unicamp - Artigos e Outros Documentos|
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