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|Type:||Artigo de periódico|
|Title:||Hume E O "dogma Do Reducionismo"|
|Abstract:||This work examines the charge made by Quine on Hume, that he adopted the "dogma" of "radical reductionism", in its "naïve" and "intolerably restrictive version", involving "an impossible term-by-term empiricism". It is argued that Hume's theory of knowledge does not seem to justify this serious imputation. Furthermore, it is indicated that Hume not only did not adopt these problematic epistemological theses, but also, on the contrary, effectively anticipated some of the philosophical positions usually attributed to Quine, such as epistemological holism and naturalism.|
|Appears in Collections:||Unicamp - Artigos e Outros Documentos|
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